



## **APLN Statement on the 4th Nuclear Security Summit: A post-Summit Stocktake and Call to Action**

We, the undersigned members of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), welcome the success of the four Nuclear Security Summits in 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 and encourage the international community to embrace the recommended follow up actions.

The fourth and final Summit of this series was held in Washington on 1 April 2016, engaging leaders from 52 countries. Their ambition is to deny terrorists access to nuclear materials which might be used for nuclear weapons and radiological devices.

We draw particular attention to the implications of the Summit process for the Asia-Pacific and call on the governments of the region to support the implementation of the Summit outcomes and action plans in order to contain and eliminate nuclear security threats in the Asia-Pacific.

We call for continued high level attention to these issues in Asia-Pacific because the threat of nuclear terrorism remains acute:

- There are still massive stocks of nuclear material world-wide, enough to increase ten-fold the world's stock of 15,000 nuclear weapons.
- Terrorist groups remain interested in acquiring nuclear materials, by whatever means necessary:
  - to use a stolen bomb;
  - to make and use a bomb using stolen materials;
  - to sabotage nuclear plants and facilities; or
  - more simply but with potentially huge health and economic impact, to make a 'dirty' radiological device using conventional explosives to disperse radioactive materials.

The gravity and magnitude of the dangers posed by the soft security of nuclear materials became very apparent at time of the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. Those events resulted in large amounts of nuclear materials, stored or in use across the former Soviet Union, being at risk due to changed political, social and economic circumstances. Russian-US collaboration in the context of the Nunn-Lugar Act was very successful in helping secure those materials and also securing a future for the dislocated scientists and



technical staff responsible for those materials. Nevertheless major challenges remain in that region, and elsewhere.

The terrorist attacks of 2001 added new urgency to the need to secure nuclear materials world-wide from theft. President Barack Obama incorporated this concern into his speech in Prague in 2009 setting out his agenda for addressing strategic nuclear threats. This led to the initial Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 and subsequent Summits in Seoul (2012) and The Hague (2014). In addition to more than fifty heads of government and other senior leaders involved in the Summits, the process has fostered coordination and the habit of consultation amongst large numbers of policy and technical experts around the globe.

This has led to practical improvement in security measures at many nuclear facilities: 30 of the 57 countries which once had weapons-usable nuclear materials have had that material removed; security arrangements have been tightened in all countries that retain such nuclear materials; and over 150 highly enriched uranium-fuelled research reactors have either been shut down or converted to low enriched uranium fuel.

However the Communiqué of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit makes clear that threats remain and more work needs to be done to strengthen nuclear security.

We strongly urge all remaining countries of the Asia-Pacific which are not yet party to join as soon as possible the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and its 2005 amendment; and the 2005 International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). They should be prompted by the third biennial Nuclear Security Index to improve their nuclear theft and sabotage precautions. And they should avail the IAEA technical guidance and peer review services. All such efforts will help to put the architecture of nuclear security on a more comprehensive, transparent, globally uniform and effective set of standards.

Although Russia did not attend the final Summit, we commend its record of constructive engagement with international responses to nuclear security threats and look forward to its future close involvement in the IAEA and elsewhere. Moreover, following former US Defense Secretary William Perry's very pertinent remarks, we urge the US and Russia to "reengage on the issue of nuclear dangers."

Finally, we would encourage all nuclear weapons possessing states to explore how best to bring nuclear materials under military control, which



account for 83 percent of all worldwide nuclear materials, into line with the international processes and efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

SIGNED

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