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NUCLEAR-FREE KOREAN PENINSULA:
STRATEGIES AND ACTION PROGRAMS FOR THE MOON JAE-IN ADMINISTRATION

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Comprehensive Moves Toward a Nuclear-Free Korean Peninsula

Conference Synthesis Report January 25, 2018

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Comprehensive Moves Toward a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula

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Executive Summary¹

This report summarises and assesses deliberations between policymakers, analysts and experts on the subject of a future nuclear-free Korean Peninsula at the Korean National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA), Seoul, the Republic of Korea (ROK), on December 11 and 12, 2017. The gathering was hosted by the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS). Co-organisers include IFANS, the Nautilus Institute and the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN).

The urgent note behind the circumstances of the discussions was unmistakable — the need to find the most feasible means to prevent conflict on the Korean Peninsula while also seeking a lasting solution involving denuclearisation. The salience of these discussions has received a further boost with the resumption of North-South Korean talks.² To that end, intentions, strategies and approaches were analysed and canvassed across six sessions.³

1. Context

The context behind the gathering supplies a background that is urgent, existential, potentially immediate and altering. The escalating rhetoric of threatened destruction between Pyongyang and Washington, urged on by the nature of the current respective leaderships, adds to the historical volatility of a peninsula that is still technically at war.

As the Chancellor of the Korean National Diplomatic Academy Cho Byung-jae noted in his opening address, the hand of the Doomsday Clock of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* has moved ever closer, currently standing at two-and-a-half minutes to midnight.⁴ "The probability of global catastrophe is very

¹This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). You are encouraged to distribute the report and to acknowledge its source. The report was prepared by Binoy Kampmark, Senior Lecturer, RMIT University, contact: bkampmark@gmail.com and Peter Hayes, Director, Nautilus Institute and Professor, Center for International Security Studies, Sydney University, contact: phayes@nautilus.org They are solely responsible for its content and any errors. Day 2 of the conference was conducted under Chatham House Rules (whereby the affiliation and identify of the speakers are not revealed) which have been observed in this report.

² Nicola Smith, "North Korea accepts offer from South to meet for talks ahead of the Winter Olympics," *The Telegraph*, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/01/05/north-korea-accepts-offer-south-meet-talks-ahead-winter-olympics/>; Charlotte Gao, "North Korea Reopens Hotline With South Korea Despite Trump's Tweet," *The Diplomat*, January 4, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/north-korea-reopens-hotline-with-south-korea-despite-trumps-tweet/>. For previous mention of such efforts, see Choe Sang-hun, "South and North Korea Agree to New Talks," *New York Times*, October 4, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/world/asia/south-and-north-korea-agree-to-resume-high-level-talks.html?_r=0.

³ These sessions are referred to as follows: Day 1, Session I: Resolving the North Korean Problem through International Collaboration; Session II: Untangling North Korean Nuclear and Missile Quagmire: Kim Jung-un's Intention, Capability and Strategy; Session III: Dealing with the North Korean Problem: Lessons Learned and Devising a New Approach; Day 2 (Closed Session), Session I: Re-stabilizing the Peninsula and Avoiding War; Session II: Critical Obstacles and Opportunities for Phased Nuclear Settlement; Session III: Developing Joint Concepts and Strategies for Implementation.

⁴ Opening Remarks, Cho Byung-jae, Day 1, Session I.

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high, and the actions needed to reduce the risks of disaster must be taken very soon.”⁵ For this reason, as ROK Minister for Foreign Affairs Kang Kyung-wha declared, a peaceful resolution is vital, however, driving the new Moon Jae-in administration to seek a lasting peace not merely on the peninsula but in the complex political environment of East Asia.⁶

The report covers presentations and discussions in the public session held on December 11 (Day 1) in the auditorium of the KNDA facility, and the closed roundtable discussion on December 12 (Day 2) at the international conference room, KNDA, where these key messages emerged:

Key messages

- Participants acknowledged opportunities for peace on the peninsula despite the adverse security environment and volatile exchanges between Washington and Pyongyang, and the seemingly intractable regional and global dangers arising from an ever provocative nuclear North Korea. “I am a believer,” insisted former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in his address on the first day, “in a denuclearised peninsula and a denuclearised world.”
- Prominent thought-makers and policy experts found considerable common ground despite areas of divergence (what an enduring peace arrangement might look like, the nature of what initial steps might be taken towards Pyongyang, and pressure tactics such as sanctions).
- Incremental steps as freeze-for-freeze options (scaling back or delaying ROK-United States military exercises in favour of cessation in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) ballistic, nuclear and weapons testing) followed by verification regimes, the signing of a peace treaty to normalise the peninsula and paving the way for a future lasting security arrangement in North East Asia, were deemed credible options. Cementing such arrangements could be achieved through a security architecture centred on the East Asia Summit and a genuinely denuclearized peninsula affirmed by a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ).
- Striking conflict off any diplomatic agenda and avoiding an inadvertent stumble into the next war should be prioritised as a matter of urgency. Removing hostile intent, eliminating grounds of mistrust and dealing with security deficits are all critical priorities. This can involve short-term projects of mutual interest with the DPRK (energy, maritime, military fields of cooperation).
- The role of the ROK was accepted as vital in any engagement, even if the exact shape of that role is unclear (taking the lead in the peace process, insisting on its own interests as distinct from its link with Washington).
- Participants urged a greater understanding between the state parties within the Six-Power framework, including the need for managing disagreements between China and the United States. Even as President Donald Trump persists in his aggressive stance, moves towards dialogue — centred on Olympic diplomacy — are already taking place. The prospect for future engagement, amidst the concern, remains promising.

⁵ Science and Security Board, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “It is two and a half minutes to midnight,” Final Statement, 2017, <https://thebulletin.org/sites/default/files/Final%202017%20Clock%20Statement.pdf>.

⁶ Remarks by Kang Kyung-wha, ROK foreign minister, Day 1, Session I.

2. The problem: the road heavily travelled

This report considers the following themes and approaches that characterised the discussions of December 11 and 12: (a) the intentions of the DPRK and its current political outlook and responses; (b) the approaches, actual and possible, towards the DPRK; (c) the issue of achieving an enduring peace settlement for the Korean peninsula factoring in denuclearisation; (d) DPRK capabilities; (e) U.S. intentions, most notably those of President Donald J. Trump; (f) notable areas of divergence and (g) convergence on all these issues.

3. North Korean intentions and approaches

Essential to the entire conflict resolution process is a considered understanding of the DPRK leadership and the motivations of its leader, Kim Jong-un. Papers and presentations, accompanied by relevant discussions, reinforced by former Prime Minister of Australia Kevin Rudd's assessment, overwhelmingly accepted the point that the DPRK leader is far from unstable, let alone mad as he is popularly caricatured.⁷ Moreover, noted Leon Sigal of the Social Science Research Council, nor is the fiery rhetoric exchanged between Pyongyang and its counterparts much more than click-bait or cat nip, with the leadership aware that the tweets of President Donald Trump are essentially weapons of mass distraction.⁸ The challenge, rather, is to identify the most feasible means by which Kim Jong-un can be encouraged to move from a state of increasingly dangerous weapons testing and arming to a point of reassurance and willingness to consider negotiations that might constitute a prelude to a denuclearised Korean peninsula. To the extent that Kim Jong-un continues to seek an easing to the United States and South Korean hostility, as his father and grandfather did, such diplomacy seems potentially promising.

Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Ambassador Thomas Pickering observed that official and open channels at the moment do not necessarily yield a clear position on diplomatic accommodation and the pursuit of nuclear weapons, though the chronology of such development offers support for neither optimists nor pessimists.⁹ One experienced diplomat quipped there is still room for the cautious optimism supplied only by lunatics.¹⁰ This is another way of saying that even the toughest situation still contains reason to hope and the seeds for change.

The historical record is full of reason to be optimistic and pessimistic at the same time, noted North Korea expert Patrick McEachern in his remarks. On February 29, 2012, a DPRK foreign ministry spokesperson suggested the U.S. and the DPRK had essentially agreed to the improvement of U.S.-DPRK relations, cultural exchanges, nutritional assistance and assurance that Light Water Reactors would be on the table for future discussions.¹¹ On March 31, 2013, before the Party's Central Committee Plenum, Kim Jong-un

⁷ Remarks of Kevin Rudd, Day 1, Session I.

⁸ Remarks of Leon Sigal, Day 1, Session II; general points reiterated by Colin Powell and Thomas Pickering, Day 1, Session I.

⁹ Remarks, Day 2, Session I.

¹⁰ Remarks of Pickering, Day 1, Session I.

¹¹ Patrick McEachern, "Reading Kim Jong Un's Lips: What is his Playbook and Intention with Nuclear Weapons?", NAPSNet Special Reports Uncategorized, December 20, 2017, <https://nautilus.org/uncategorized/reading-kim-jong-uns-lips-what-is-his-playbook-and-intention-with-nuclear-weapons/>

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embraced the concept of byungjin, “a new strategic line in carrying out economic reconstruction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously... [expanding upon the] original [byungjin] line of simultaneously developing the national economy and national defence.”¹² Denuclearisation could be realised, but only after the initial expansion of the nuclear armed forces in both a qualitative and quantitative sense, and the ending of the “hostile policy” of the United States.¹³ Kim Jong-un’s Seventh Party Congress speech suggests a more elaborate picture of various delivery formats for its nuclear options beyond single delivery, including land and sea-based options.¹⁴ The survivability of such delivery systems has also posed challenges to U.S. planners and allies.

Despite seemingly contradictory approaches, recent views have also been made that the DPRK is open to negotiations with Washington, notably coming from Russia, a point reiterated in the sessions.¹⁵ There has been background activity — a state of talks about having talks.¹⁶ There were even suggestions that talks with the DPRK, featuring various power stakeholders, notably ROK and the United States, could commence within a matter of months, if not one month, either on the basis of no preconditions or reciprocity.¹⁷ That said, there was also a view that caution should be shown towards DPRK as it exploits ambiguities and is a master of wedge tactics. The views of the formal DPRK Congress do not necessarily tally with those of DPRK cabinet.¹⁸ But to suggest that the DPRK has moved into a phase beyond deterrence is contestable. A view based on studies of DPRK official releases and commentary suggests the state was capable of being deterred while also preferring deterrence to pre-emption.¹⁹

4. Approaches to DPRK

As former Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs and Ambassador Nobuyasu Abe argued, the issue is one of encouraging a reduction of mutual mistrust on the one hand, and overcoming the security deficit on the other.²⁰ Small and immediate steps to build and entrench trust are possible. For one, there had to be a reassurance that the United States has no intention of initiating preventive or pre-emptive war on the DPRK. Reducing such a deficit is unlikely to happen with a mere peace treaty between, for instance, the DPRK and the United States. A piece of paper is not a guarantee to give up nuclear weapons. According to Morton Halperin, former of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State, a regime guarantee might be warranted, one where the United States offers not to use force to overthrow the Pyongyang regime.²¹ Irrespective of such guarantees, however, participants suggested that such agreement would not preclude any spontaneous change along the lines that took place in the Soviet Union and German Democratic Republic at the end of the Cold War.

¹² KCBS, April 2, 2013, noted in McEachern, “Reading Kim Jong Un’s Lips.”

¹³ McEachern, “Reading Kim Jong Un’s Lips”; remarks, Day 2, Session I.

¹⁴ McEachern, “Reading Kim Jong Un’s Lips”; remarks, Day 2, Session I.

¹⁵ Remarks on Day 2, Session III; Julian Borger, “North Korea ready to open talks with US, says Russia’s Sergei Lavrov,” *Guardian*, December 8, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/07/north-korea-ready-direct-talks-us-sergei-lavrov>.

¹⁶ Remarks, Day 2, Session I.

¹⁷ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

¹⁸ Remarks, Day 2, Session I.

¹⁹ Remarks, Day 2, Session I.

²⁰ Remarks of Abe Nobuyasu, Day 1, Session II.

²¹ Remarks of Morton Halperin, Day 1, Session III; Day 2, Sessions I, III.

The Olympic moment

Initial steps also include an olive branch for DPRK engagement at the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics and Paralympics.²² Cho Byung-jae averred that the Olympic moment can also ensure in initial agreements the avoidance of hostile actions from both sides. Georgy Toloraya, director of the Asian Strategy Center for the Institute of Economy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, suggests possible arrangements for dialogue would envisage the DPRK, ROK and the United States participating, at minimum, with countries such as Russia happy to promote their offices to this end.²³

Senior advisor, China Reform Forum and former General Zhenqiang Pan and Alexander Vorontsov, head, Department for Korean and Mongolian Studies, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, argued that an important initial option would be the possibility for freeze-for-freeze. In its original Chinese and later Russian version, “freeze for freeze” meant the complete suspension of U.S.-ROK military exercises on the one hand, and of DPRK nuclear missile and nuclear testing on the other. Conversely, some participants suggested that a negotiable “freeze for freeze” agreement might be more nuanced, entailing changing the scale, location and frequency of these activities on both sides rather than complete ending of these activities. However, everyone seemed clear that all nuclear warhead testing by the DPRK must cease for such a formula to be workable.²⁴ This agreement might also be accompanied by an opening of unconditional dialogue with the DPRK. At the same time, as former foreign minister of Mongolia Nyam-Osor Tuya suggested, other channels could be pursued in countries such as Mongolia, using Track 1.5 or Track 2.0 talks.²⁵ The use of United Nation facilities might also be pursued. But any such talks would have to be accompanied by an understanding of clear definitions of objectives.²⁶

The possibility of approaching the DPRK through military channels was also considered. The very nature of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) as a defined military boundary and site of occasional deadly clashes suggests possible military-to-military overtures.²⁷

Energy cooperation

The field of energy cooperation also furnishes an important set of options in the immediate short-term, through building trust, and as part of a lasting security arrangement. The timeline issue was of concern, as the completion of energy infrastructure investments may take 10 or more years and would do little to encourage the immediate abandonment of nuclear weapons or to prevent an acceleration of the DPRK weapons program.²⁸ But various short-range energy options could also be put on the diplomatic table and exchanged for a reduction of fissile material production, as Nautilus Institute energy expert David von

²² Opening Remarks, Cho Byung-jae, Day 1, Session I.

²³ Remarks of Georgy Toloraya, Day I, Session II.

²⁴ Remarks of Alexander Vorontsov and Pan Zhenqiang and general discussion on Day 1, Session III.

²⁵ Remarks of Nyam-Osor Tuya, Day 1, Session II.

²⁶ Remarks, Day 2, Session I.

²⁷ Remarks, Day 2, Session II

²⁸ Remarks on Day 2, Session II

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Hippel and Nautilus Institute Director Peter Hayes documented in a detailed and quantitative presentation to participants. Certain specific power options are also possible. One entails bringing a Russian nuclear-powered barge into the mix. Another is to build a gas-fired power plant. This might present a potential quid pro quo as other small projects are undertaken.²⁹

The energy argument was also seen as a useful approach by discussants as it would involve the DPRK in international structures, elevate interdependency and encourage compliance. The DPRK could be involved in regional oil and natural gas pipelines. Electricity grid interconnections could involve Simpo/Kumho reactors. Renewable energy options and sharing of excess oil refining capacity might also be developed. Cooperation on transportation infrastructure can feature in discussions.³⁰ These could have immediate impacts, even in the short-term. Tangible, multiple fuel-type plans can be delivered in different regions across building types and projects within a 6 month period.³¹ Failures according to means and institutional limits will be expected, but successes can be pointed to as a basis of confidence that the DPRK means what it says while also showing a reciprocal commitment from the international community in delivering what was promised. Additional areas of joint cooperation could also figure in the military sphere, which might include such elements as search and rescue, fisheries management and joint oceanographic research and vessel control in certain areas of the ocean west of the Korean Peninsula.³²

Managing differences

A view was expressed that the Six-Party energy group exercise should be avoided in future approaches towards the DPRK. Previous efforts to chalk up a list for U.S. negotiators failed to make much impact. Out of 100 viable options from an international development perspective, there was a 5 percent overlap with the options pursued by the DPRK negotiators. Of that percentage, 5 percent of the options were adopted.³³ Developing projects of high impact makes regional sense, embedding the DPRK in regional energy interdependence.

Other incentives to build trust would also have to demonstrate a sense of independence on the part of ROK, with an appraisal of its own security interests as distinct from those of Washington. During Day 1 of the conference former foreign minister of Thailand Kasit Piromya registered the perspective that the South Koreans are too closely aligned with Washington's interests.³⁴ This would require a management and coordination of differences, an understanding that the DPRK or any future unified Korea avoid a buffer zone, but constitute part of a genuinely secure denuclearized area — a view advanced by General Pan Zhenqiang on Day 1.³⁵

²⁹ Remarks on Day 2, Session II.

³⁰ Remarks, Day 2, Session II. See also David von Hippel and Peter Hayes, "Energy Insecurity in the DPRK: Linkages to Regional Energy Security," NAPSNet Special Reports, January 3, 2018, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/energy-insecurity-in-the-dprk-linkages-to-regional-energy-security-and-the-nuclear-weapons-issue/>.

³¹ Remarks, Day 2, Session II.

³² Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

³³ Remarks, Day 2, Session II.

³⁴ Remarks of Kasit Piromya, Day 1, Session II; Pan Zhenqiang, Day 1, Session III.

³⁵ Remarks by Pan Zhenqiang, Day 1, Session III.

5. Enduring settlements

Participants suggested that a nuclear-free Korean peninsula must be viewed in macro and micro terms. A corollary of that required an appraisal of the problem in terms of stages — a set of phased negotiations, tangible steps, assurances, guarantees and verification regimes.

Past the point of a suspension, a “freeze-for-freeze” option and reassurances on the part of the parties (DPRK on halting nuclear advancement and ballistic missile tests; the USA-ROK scaling back or temporarily suspending military activities and manoeuvres), come points of how to generate the grounds for permanent settlement of the North Korean issue. A regional NWFZ is a potentially clinching reassurance that surpasses an otherwise brittle denuclearized Korean Peninsula, as argued by Morton Halperin and Peter Hayes on Day 1. A full-fledged NWFZ legal treaty format avoids competing claims of sovereignty over the peninsula, acknowledging that the September 2005 principles issued at the fourth round of the Six Party Talks have been superseded. Peter Hayes noted that the DPRK’s confidence that agreements will endure multiple political cycles in the ROK and the United States will have to be maintained, ensuring that offers will be long-lasting beyond the lifespan of administrations.³⁶ The DPRK will want assurances that what they are offered is genuinely stable, or more than bilateral. Undertakings should, for instance, survive successive ROK and U.S. administrations.³⁷

Discussions of a genuine, nuclear-free peninsula led to further suggestions. Yang Xiyu, senior fellow at the China Institute of International Studies, proposed that a set of arrangements for a permanent peace regime are needed that would replace the Armistice with a peace treaty, while achieving reconciliation, cooperation and a peaceful relationship between the ROK and DPRK; the establishment of DPRK-United States peaceful co-existence; defined rights and responsibilities for Washington and Beijing in friendly cooperation towards the DPRK and the ROK and, in all senses, non-intervention in an independent unification process and full security guarantees to the nuclear weapon free Peninsula.³⁸

Six-phase plan

A more developed plan for a comprehensive security settlement would involve six phases: the creation of a Six Party-Northeast Asia Security Council; the ending of sanctions over time; a declaration of non-hostility; the ending of the Korean Armistice with the signing of a peace treaty; the provision of economic and energy aid to DPRK that would encompass energy, telecom, logistics, transport, mobility, trading, financial networks via the DPRK land-bridge linking Eurasia with Japan and ROK; and finally, the establishment of a NWFZ. Such an interlocking system crowned by a NWFZ constitutes an important contribution to the lasting nature of any such arrangement. As Morton Halperin explained, although this element would only come into being in the final phase of negotiations, it would nonetheless be an

³⁶ Remarks of Halperin and Hayes, Day 1, Session III.

³⁷ Remarks of Halperin and Hayes, Day 1, Session III.

³⁸ Yang Xiyu, “Untangling North Korean Nuclear and Missile Quagmire: The past, present, and exit strategy,” Day 1, Session II; remarks Day 2, Session III.

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incentive to create lasting peace whilst seeking a nuclear free peninsula.³⁹ Peter Hayes added that it would also be a means of managing the threat as the DPRK incrementally disarmed, then enabling it to come into compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.⁴⁰

Morton Halperin outlined the phases that must be implemented to achieve consistent results in this settlement. The first would involve an initial freeze on nuclear and missile tests and fissile material production in return for the United States and ROK scaling back joint military exercises, including the deployment of strategic bombers and the easing of some modest sanctions. The Six-Party talks would then come into play without preconditions with all issues on the table, each phase being implemented as talks proceed with nothing agreed until all in that phase was agreed. The resumption of Six-Party talks presages the second phase – that North Korea undertakes to initially dismantle nuclear material production facilities, including enrichment declaration and disablement verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency and even inspectors from the United States.⁴¹

To this end, participants questioned whether this nuclear free guarantee also encompassed a guarantee against extended nuclear deterrence – that such deterrence itself might be a problem to dispel from the security equation on the Peninsula.⁴² Such discussions also prompted remarks on the need to be precise about forms of deterrence. Conventional deterrence on the peninsula had worked for over five decades. The issue of grand nuclear deterrence went beyond the specifics of the U.S.-ROK alliance.⁴³

The fundamental logic here is that the DPRK has to be given something for its security to abandon the political leverage that comes with possessing its nuclear weapons. Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell observed that the only instance in history of a state voluntarily disbanding its own nuclear weapons is South Africa. A less convincing precedent is Libya and the diplomatic efforts to rehabilitate the Qaddafi regime after years of isolation after undertakings to remove any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capacity from its arsenal.⁴⁴ An option specific to the context of the DPRK, and the broader security dimension of the peninsula, must be sought.⁴⁵

Structural legal issues also had to be considered, notably in any post-armistice phase. The issue of whether the United States and ROK are in a legal state of war with the DPRK is an important one, as it would affect the way presidential power is exercised.⁴⁶ The nature of executive power in the United States duly alters depending on whether the state of affairs is one of peace or war. Even Chinese figures in this

³⁹ Remarks of Halperin, Day 1, Session III; and see Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes, Chung-in Moon, Thomas Pickering, Lee Sigal, "Ending the North Korean Nuclear Threat by a Comprehensive Security Settlement in Northeast Asia," NAPSNet Policy Forum, June 26, 2017.

⁴⁰ Remarks of Hayes, Day 1, Session III.

⁴¹ Points made in Halperin et al, "Ending the North Korean Threat by a Comprehensive Security Settlement in Northeast Asia"; discussion and remarks from Halperin and Hayes, Day I, Session III; Day 2, Session III.

⁴² Remarks, Day 2, Session II.

⁴³ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

⁴⁴ Remarks of Colin Powell, Day 1, Session I.

⁴⁵ General remarks, Day 2, Session III.

⁴⁶ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

field are not clear on this point. These are military issues that could be facilitated by dialogue and collaboration.

6. North Korean capabilities

Participants noted the gap of understanding in terms of capabilities of the DPRK and the presence of any coherent weapons doctrine. How best to read the lips of its leaders and identify strengths and means should conflict break out?⁴⁷ Suggestions have been made that the speech at the 7th Party Congress supplies some clarity on the subject of doctrine. It was evident that a diversification of the nuclear program had taken place, both in terms of quantity and quality.⁴⁸ Such an approach was also envisioned as a means of combating the likelihood of a successful preventative strike by the United States. But for all its progress, could it even be described as a nuclear power in the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as such, or merely a power with nuclear weapons?⁴⁹ Nuclear weapons in these terms supplied political, rather than military leverage.

In a maximalist sense, Pyongyang has given indications of seeking to end what it terms U.S. “hostile policy,” though what this hostility amounts to is unclear.⁵⁰ Its 2012 Foreign Ministry statement articulated various elements: a concluded peace treaty, the ending of sanctions, an end to U.S.-ROK military exercises and state recognition, the acceptance of space activity operations and the provision of nuclear energy assistance.⁵¹

There are also knowledge gaps over various touted weapons that could be deployed in any future conflict, including the KN-09 (KN-SS-X-9), a 300mm Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) reported to have a range of 190 kilometres.⁵² These also could be outfitted to carry chemical warheads, though biological weapons are slow acting and for use against populations as opposed to military targets.⁵³ The Korean Ministry of Defence white paper states there were 10 launcher trucks at the end of 2016 – a figure probably arrived at, one participant mused, because we have 10 fingers.⁵⁴ Its effectiveness could be compromised by ROK jamming capabilities and time required for reloading the launcher, which would be somewhere in the order of 45-60 minutes. Stabilizers would have to be retracted, the sheltered area would have to be reached, individual rockets loaded and returned to the firing point.⁵⁵ The new weapon system not only buttressed the threats to ROK cities that were limited by the range of other artillery and

⁴⁷ Patrick McEachern, “Reading Kim Jong Un’s Lips: What is his Playbook and Intention with Nuclear Weapons?”, NAPSNet Special Reports Uncategorized, December 20, 2017, <https://nautilus.org/uncategorized/reading-kim-jong-uns-lips-what-is-his-playbook-and-intention-with-nuclear-weapons/>

⁴⁸ Remarks, Day 2, Session I.

⁴⁹ Remarks, Day 2, Session II.

⁵⁰ Remarks, Day 2, Session I.

⁵¹ Remarks, Day 2, Session I.

⁵² Remarks, Day 2, Session II.

⁵³ Remarks on Day 2, Session II.

⁵⁴ Republic of Korea, *2016 Defense White Paper* (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, May, 2017), http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mndEN/upload/pblictN/PBLICTNEBOOK_201705180357180050.pdf.

⁵⁵ All points outlined here made Day 2, session II.

rocket systems deployed along the DMZ, but also creates a new conventional “rung” in the escalation ladder that the DPRK might employ in a near-war to attempt to halt a pending US-ROK attack, or at least a DPRK perception that an attack is underway. This system may manifest a DPRK desire to not be limited to massive retaliation with nuclear weapons or pre-emptive strikes, but to project a more subtle threat based on interrelated conventional and nuclear weapons.

7. U.S. intentions and opportunities

The basis of any engagement with Pyongyang is the conduct of the state it fears most – the United States. DPRK provocation has been rhetorically matched by the Trump administration, tweets and all. Discussions centred on the prospect of concern at the specifically business minded nature of the U.S. president and opportunity his less than orthodox approach might earn. Arguably, President Donald Trump is the least likely yet most credible in some senses to strike a deal, given the intractable nature of the Korean nuclear problem. He is arguably politically astute, even gifted.⁵⁶ But, as Senior Advisor to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue Tony Namkung observed, the real-estate-based transactional nature of Trump’s engagement is hardly likely to pay dividends. Nor does the “maximum pressure and engagement approach” officially adopted, one of putting the DPRK into a corner, seem much different from previous U.S. administrations.⁵⁷

The perception that Mr. Trump might consider a unilateral strike on DPRK facilities is the most troubling, not merely to the DPRK and South Korea but to China, where conservative strategic thinking reigns. The point is also concerning to members of the North-East Asia alliance system.⁵⁸ There was also comment on perceptions of instability and competence within the administration itself from such figures as Senator Bob Corker and even the U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, with questions on the scope of executive authority in the launching of nuclear weapons.⁵⁹ Volatility towards the DPRK, and an unreliable disposition towards traditional alliances, is also cause for concern. It suggests a difficult proposition: how can we expect to forge common ground between such powers as the ROK and China with a president whose intentions are mercurial?⁶⁰ This could also be extended further, considering the general lack of awareness on Capitol Hill and in U.S. congressional circles about how to approach the DPRK in a more general sense, and the lack of consensus between political parties.⁶¹

The unruly domestic dimension of the Trump administration makes the trajectory of U.S. policy unpredictable. The issue of Russian interference in the elections of 2016 under review by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the groundswell of protest regarding the issue of sexual harassment and

⁵⁶ Remarks on Day 2, Session I.

⁵⁷ Remarks of K.A. Tony Namkung, Day 1, Session III.

⁵⁸ Remarks of Rudd, Day 1, Session I.

⁵⁹ Remarks, Day 2, Session I

⁶⁰ Remarks, Day 2, Session I.

⁶¹ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

inappropriate conduct across various forums of power, the issue of the mid-term elections and a patchy domestic agenda render any stable assessment of Mr. Trump difficult.⁶²

8. Points of divergence

Divergences existed in key areas of establishing a nuclear weapons-free peninsula. One participant even commented, “We do not have any good solutions to solve the problem.”⁶³ What should be given up in achieving a NWFZ? Furthermore, would these measures genuinely encourage Pyongyang to achieve a denuclearised peninsula? Should negotiating parties give up hope that Pyongyang will give up nuclear weapons? Or should they make a move first?⁶⁴

The first point of contention was the probable danger of an outbreak of conflict, an issue addressed in-depth on Day 1 by both Colin Powell and Thomas Pickering. While the urgency of the security and political situation on the peninsula was stressed, the risk of an outbreak of hostilities was a matter of conjecture. Mathematical probabilities were advanced and disputed. Figures ranging from zero to 5 percent, then from 20 to 25 percent rising to 50 percent were suggested, though such probabilities were not necessarily useful.⁶⁵ The figure of potential outbreak of hostilities at zero to 5 percent came from assessments about the potential volatile behaviour from the Trump White House, and the fact that other regional areas such as Southeast Asia might be more susceptible to conflict.⁶⁶ Kevin Rudd reported the mood in some quarters in Beijing was certainly pessimistic, with many Chinese officials fearing a unilateral strike against the DPRK by the Trump administration.⁶⁷

Approaching DPRK leadership

In supplying reassurances to the North, the question of who best to approach within the DPRK regime was debated. Kim Jong-un remains young and new to possessing the capability of nuclear weapons, so caution in directly approaching him was expressed.⁶⁸ Far better to consider the coterie of senior advisors, some of whom have sought engagement with officials from the United States at stages. General Kim Yong Chol, for example, said to have been in charge of attacking the ROK warship *Cheonan*, springs to mind, being a well-known leader who expressed keen interest in meeting high ranking officials from Washington, but was angered when rebuffed by former Intelligence Chief James Clapper on his trip to Pyongyang to retrieve American journalists.⁶⁹

⁶² Remarks, Day 2, Session I.

⁶³ Remarks on Day 2, Session III.

⁶⁴ Questions posed on Day 2, Session II.

⁶⁵ Remarks of Colin Powell and Thomas Pickering, Day 1, Session I; Day 2, Session I.

⁶⁶ Remarks on Day 2, Session I.

⁶⁷ Remarks of Rudd, Day 1, Session I.

⁶⁸ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

⁶⁹ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

Negotiating substantive issues

The issue then would be what to put on the table. Procedure is the handmaiden of substance; seeking that substance is a singular tougher course. What had to be asked is where the substance has taken the parties.⁷⁰ The *scope* of negotiations was as important as having them – consider, for instance, previous efforts at the beginning of the Six-Party talks, which saw the United States wanting to include chemical and biological weapons on the same bill with nuclear weapons. Any such negotiation risks having to include virtually everything, including specific concerns from various linked states.⁷¹ There would also be the issue of specifics in terms of the initial talks on the freeze or suspension of tests. The issue of intercontinental ballistic missile testing, a bone of contention, notably for Washington, as Georgy Toloraya remarked, might have to be central in the initial phase of dialogue.⁷² There are other issues such as the abduction question with Japan, which might be negotiated separately.⁷³ There is the issue among the relevant countries, for instance, of supplying economic assistance to the DPRK.

Approaches within the Six-Power format

Participants discussed approaches within the Six-Power format. The ROK might take the lead in hammering out a consensus with Japan, China, Russia and the United States as to what political goals should be prioritised.⁷⁴ The United States-China conversation with ROK involvement in achieving a denuclearised peninsula was suggested as essential to this end. Sadly, Washington's approach towards China on that score, certainly during the Trump administration, has been shoddy, leaving an impression the United States was not serious in wanting a workable approach.⁷⁵ What needed to be on the table were such matters as averting the chaos of a possible regime implosion, the creation not of a buffer zone but one of genuine neutrality and the issue of neighbour accommodation and security. Concern was registered that Washington's antics may have jeopardised such goals. This is further complicated by Washington's containment strategies towards Beijing and its insistence on a continuing hegemonic role.⁷⁶

Decoupling the ROK from the United States in terms of its strategic relationship vis-à-vis North Korea was deemed by some participants as desirable and even indispensable in any lasting peace arrangement.⁷⁷ Seoul should immediately make it clear that it should not be playing "second fiddle."⁷⁸ A nuclear-free peninsula has to also be truly neutral. It was suggested that the fallout of such a decoupling might be mitigated by a United Nations peacekeeping force, some of which could be made up of extant U.S. forces, supplemented by Chinese, Russian and Australian troops.⁷⁹ Divergence on this was clear. As Leon Sigal stated in his comments on Day 1, to put faith in the United Nations peacekeeping forces could be unwise,

⁷⁰ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

⁷¹ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

⁷² Remarks of Georgy Toloraya, Day 1, Session II.

⁷³ Remarks Day 2, Session III.

⁷⁴ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

⁷⁵ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

⁷⁶ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

⁷⁷ Remarks of Kasit Piromya, Day 1, Session II. For concerns about decoupling, consider remarks of Rudd, Day 1, Session I.

⁷⁸ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

⁷⁹ Remarks of Kasit Piromya, Day 1, Session II.

given its previous failed undertakings, while the continued presence of U.S. soldiers maintained necessary deterrence.⁸⁰ A countering view was that ROK-U.S. military exercises, and the presence of the United States, had maintained rather than deterred peace. Military exercises were capable of being deferred, delayed and cancelled and might even take place in third countries.⁸¹ Yet such a move should not be negotiated without a quid pro quo. Nor could it be unequivocally shown that Pyongyang necessarily demanded the removal or change of status of U.S. troops on the peninsula – Kim Il-sung had previously stated that U.S. troops could still remain pending ultimate denuclearisation.⁸² Furthermore, the policy of the DPRK involves not merely ending enmity and ensuring regime security, but flipping allies.⁸³ The fact that it has responded in 2006, 2009, 2013 and 2017 with the conducting of nuclear tests in the face of cooperation from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), notably between China and the United States, is testament to this point.⁸⁴

One method of coping with the notion of having the ROK take the lead with the DPRK is not necessarily positioning it as such.⁸⁵ Diplomatic processes, once commenced, can lose their origin, effectively becoming owned by the respective parties once success eventuates. An example to that end was the Perry process in engaging Pyongyang during the Clinton administration. Both the ROK and Japan, despite being initially reluctant starters, subsequently accepted it as their own. Another related point was to what extent South Korean domestic opinion, including more conservative political factions, would play in driving the impetus behind the process vis-à-vis the negotiating stance taken by Pyongyang.⁸⁶

The effect of sanctions

Participants also disagreed on the role played by existing policies on compelling Pyongyang to the diplomatic table while also retarding its nuclear program. Historically, when sanction regimes have been imposed, notably with U.S.-Chinese agreement, Pyongyang, far from being dissuaded, has actively pursued weapons testing.⁸⁷ As a tool it has repeatedly failed in compelling and coercing parties.⁸⁸ A total sanctions regime would encourage the DPRK to resist more forcefully. Yang Xiyu noted that full containment of Pyongyang, leaving no doors to engage, is an option fraught with danger.⁸⁹ Energy studies have also suggested that disruptions to the coal-export cap, a dramatic cut in Chinese oil exports to DPRK, and a reduction of hard currency earnings for the North are unlikely to significantly affect the military, if at all. David von Hippel and Peter Hayes added that the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs

⁸⁰ Remarks of Sigal, Day 1, Session II.

⁸¹ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

⁸² Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

⁸³ Remarks of Leon Sigal, Day 1, Session II.

⁸⁴ Remarks of Sigal, Day I, Session II.

⁸⁵ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

⁸⁶ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

⁸⁷ Remarks, Day 2, Session I.

⁸⁸ Remarks, Day 1, Session II.

⁸⁹ Remarks of Yang Xiyu, Day 1, Session II.

will suffer negligibly, and given its short war strategy, the Korean Peoples' Army is unlikely to be affected by sanctions.⁹⁰

These observations suggest that sanctions do not work, though participants showed disagreement about the extent to which targeted sanctions might prove effective. Some form of pressure was required to prevent or slow down the DPRK nuclear missile build-up by restricting materials coming into the North. Ambassador Nobuyasu Abe observed that humanitarian consequences were regrettable, but could be ameliorated through the provision of separate humanitarian assistance.⁹¹ There were also differing views about the nature of the DPRK's economic performance. On the one hand, notions of a touted North Korean economic success were exaggerated. Since the ascension of power by Kim Jong-un, some 23 special economic zones have been built. Yang Xiyu reported that many of these zones remain empty, still awaiting capital and trade to boost the economy. Such opportunities have been eliminated by sanctions, most conspicuously in the rural areas.⁹²

9. Converging points

Points of convergence emerged in the discussions. The ultimate and necessary denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula was accepted in all sessions. As stated by Nyam-Osor Tuya, to permit the continued existence of a nuclear DPRK would allow an agent of destabilisation to exist on the peninsula and the whole region, while also affecting non-proliferation norms.⁹³ It could also be argued that a nuclear state in the form the DPRK had taken was against the normative structure entailed by such instruments as the United Nations Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty.⁹⁴

What surfaced was that denuclearisation had to be deemed the endpoint rather than the precondition.⁹⁵ A parallel with mathematical and practical senses of solving a problem was considered by way of analogy: You start on an intractable problem; you find a part of that selected problem then identify the part you feel you can easily solve.⁹⁶

Common ground for a grand bargain

The anchoring stability of the Six-Power format, despite being moribund, could still be used as part of what would ultimately be a Grand Bargain.⁹⁷ According to Kevin Rudd, keeping the Six Party framework intact in some form would appeal to such states as China.⁹⁸ To that would be the role played by additional actors: the UNSC and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Common ground for a grand

⁹⁰ Remarks, Day 2, Session II; Hippel and Hayes, "Energy Insecurity in the DPRK."

⁹¹ Remarks of Abe Nobuyasu, Day 1, Session II.

⁹² Remarks of Yang Xiyu, Day 1, Session II.

⁹³ Remarks of Nyam-Osor Tuya, Day 1, Session III.

⁹⁴ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

⁹⁵ Discussions and remarks, Day 2, Session III.

⁹⁶ Discussions and remarks, Day 2, Session III.

⁹⁷ Remarks of Rudd, Day 1, Session I; Day 2, Session III.

⁹⁸ Remarks of Rudd, Day 1, Session I.

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bargain also found form in deliberations over a comprehensive, durable settlement that would involve a set of regional and international factors, topped by the interlocking device of a NWFZ. Participants agreed with Morton Halperin's conclusion that various immediate steps were needed. These include the freezing of military exercises and tests, sketching a timetable for the destruction of nuclear weapons and the issuance of external security guarantees from the United States and China with economic incentives for northern development.⁹⁹ But this would have to go further, be it through regional security architecture to calm the temperature and settle disputes, whether along the lines of an East Asia Summit as suggested by Kevin Rudd, or more specific phased processes as envisioned by Morton Halperin and colleagues.¹⁰⁰

Any kinetic military option or resolution of the dispute through force of arms was accepted as off the table: jaw jaw is certainly preferable to war war.¹⁰¹ The use of nuclear weapons, argued Colin Powell, could only be envisaged with a total collapse of the political environment.¹⁰² "[The] ROK do not believe United States would use such military force without prior agreement," noted Moon Chung-in. Any use of nuclear force on the part of Pyongyang, for instance, would be deemed an act of terrorism.¹⁰³ "Diplomacy," argued Kevin Rudd, "will be essential to avoid sleepwalking into war in Northeast Asia and to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."¹⁰⁴ The improvements in DPRK military capabilities, the increasing difficulty to target nuclear facilities in any strike and the sheer consequences of an accelerated conflict with regional and global implications would be untenable.¹⁰⁵ There would be no use of force in that sense, but should it take place, it could only do so with express consent from ROK.¹⁰⁶ Such weapons should not be considered as merely another form of standard artillery.¹⁰⁷

An even more nuanced appraisal of sleepwalking was that of the accidental launch, or surprise attack. The pressing problem is the fear that a war could occur even though no one would want it. The point is amply described by what Tom Schelling called the reciprocal fear of surprise attack, making the Cold War by way of analogy probably better than that of the Guns of August.¹⁰⁸ The cycle needed to be broken by which Washington and Seoul fear an attack by the DPRK because of statements or provocation.

An incremental approach to North Korea was generally agreed as the most appropriate, be it in terms of small, reciprocal steps to build up trust, accompanied by parallel approaches. Foremost would be advances made to convince Pyongyang that its regime need not fear preventive war from the United

⁹⁹ Remarks of Morton Halperin, Day 1, Session III; Toloraya, Day 1, Session II; Day 2, Session III.

¹⁰⁰ Kevin Rudd, The North Korean Nuclear Problem, NAPSNet Policy Forum, December 21, 2017, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/the-north-korean-nuclear-problem/>

¹⁰¹ Remarks of Rudd, Day 1, Session I; Day 2, Session III. Kevin Rudd claims this to be from Winston Churchill, though it may be a misattribution. Harold Macmillan makes this remark on a visit to Australia: *New York Times*, "Jaw-Jaw is Best, Macmillan finds; Repeats Churchill's remark preferring it to war-war – Addresses Australians," Jan. 30, 1958.

¹⁰² Remarks, Day 1, Session 1.

¹⁰³ Remarks of Powell, Day 1, Session I.

¹⁰⁴ Kevin Rudd, The North Korean Nuclear Problem, NAPSNet Policy Forum, December 21, 2017,

<https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/the-north-korean-nuclear-problem/>. The reference to sleepwalkers stems from Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: how Europe went to war in 1914* (London: Allen Lane, 2012).

¹⁰⁵ Remarks made by Powell, Pickering and Rudd on Day 1, Session 1; Day 2, Sessions I, III.

¹⁰⁶ Remarks of Halperin, Day 1, Session III, and Day 2, Sessions I and III.

¹⁰⁷ Remarks of Powell, Day 1, Session 1.

¹⁰⁸ Remarks on Day 2, Session III. See also Barbara Tuchman, *Guns of August* (London: Constable, 1962).

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States.¹⁰⁹ This could be argued to be a question of what Deng Xiaoping described as crossing “the river by feeling the bottom one stone at a time.”¹¹⁰ The DPRK could not be expected to relinquish its political leverage without something in return.¹¹¹ Those steps, the nature of feeling the bottom of that river, might well constitute the following: a freeze-for-freeze option to initially cool the situation and gain trust of respective parties, followed by phases of a peace process, verification agreements and a NWFZ. A final stage agreement featuring a NWFZ agreement also received some support.¹¹² It entrenches a security arrangement as a guarantee, but it also acts as an incentive for compliance. Importantly, it shifts the focus away from the more pointed issue of specifically denuclearizing North Korea, as opposed to a zone free of nuclear weapons.¹¹³

Although some form of pressure needs to be maintained on the DPRK, this should be accompanied by a reduced focus on military muscle in favour of integrated approaches.¹¹⁴ Pressure, to that end, requires husbanding so that it cannot be spent before the shaping of an acceptable response.¹¹⁵ The danger in the current context is that pressure can also be misapplied.¹¹⁶ Incentives, and the rectifying of perennial mutual mistrusts, must be priorities.

Mr. Trump remains a destabilising influence and, as a wildcard, hard to assess. Will there be a legacy? Or is the approach a flash-in-the-pan phenomenon? It is certain that his intentions can be exaggerated. Alliances, despite being rocked, tend to remain in place. The prospect for a radical reappraisal with direct negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang is not out of the question. Despite a sense that analysts might be needed to assess the current White House, arrangements towards a peaceful outcome were not necessarily impossible.¹¹⁷ It is precisely such a political environment that might afford opportunities.

Common ground, it was also accepted, must be found between the major negotiating powers. Within the Six-Power format, it is essential that China and the United States agree on the best process to achieve a denuclearized peninsula. Nor should China be attributed more leveraging power over DPRK than it actually has now.¹¹⁸ The increasing strength of the ROK-US-Japan military triangle, and the absence of the historical DPRK-PRC-USSR triangle, along with normalisation of ROK-China relations, observed Yang Xiyu, has led to an imbalance of power in Northeast Asia.¹¹⁹ A “short-cut” in terms of rectifying this has come from the weapons program of the DPRK, but it should also be remembered that this does not mean that denuclearisation, a goal affirmed by Kim Il-sung, is off the table.

¹⁰⁹ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

¹¹⁰ Remarks of Rudd, Day 1, Session I.

¹¹¹ Remarks Day 2, Session I; Pickering, Day 1, Session I; Sigal, Day 1, Session II.

¹¹² General remarks, Day 1, Session III; Day 2, Session III.

¹¹³ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

¹¹⁴ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

¹¹⁵ Remarks, Day 2, Session I.

¹¹⁶ Remarks, Day 2, Session I.

¹¹⁷ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

¹¹⁸ Remarks, Day 2, Session III.

¹¹⁹ Remarks from Yang Xiyu, Day 1, Session II.

10. Concluding remarks

Despite the adverse security environment, the ill-tempered exchanges between Washington and Pyongyang and the seemingly intractable dangers arising from an ever provocative nuclear North Korea, the opportunities for peace on the peninsula have, paradoxically enough, been acknowledged. Despite grounds of divergence (to name a few: the disagreement on what enduring peace arrangements might look like, the nature of what initial steps might be taken towards Pyongyang and divergence over pressure tactics such as sanctions), participants found considerable common ground. Sleepwalking or inadvertent stumbling into conflict should be avoided as a matter of urgency, with war as an option stricken off any agenda for engagement. Removing hostile intent, eliminating mistrust and dealing with security deficits are all critical priorities. The role of the ROK, even if the exact shape of that role is unclear, was accepted as vital. A greater understanding between the powers within the Six-Power framework was also urged, including a greater need for managing disagreements between China and the United States. Even as President Trump persists in his bellicose stance, the moves towards a dialogue, centred on Olympic diplomacy, is already being considered.¹²⁰ The prospect for future dialogue, amidst the angst, remains promising.

¹²⁰ Smith, "North Korea accepts offer from South to meet for talks ahead of the Winter Olympics,"; Gao, "North Korea Reopens Hotline With South Korea Despite Trump's Tweet."

Attachment 1

2017 IFANS CONFERENCE ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS

**NUCLEAR-FREE KOREAN PENINSULA:
STRATEGIES AND ACTION PROGRAMS FOR
THE MOON JAE-IN ADMINISTRATION**

PROGRAM



Korea National Diplomatic Academy

Outline

- **Date:** December 11 (Mon.)-12 (Tue.), 2017
- **Venue:** Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA), Seoul, ROK
- **Host:** Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), KNDA
- **Co-organizers:** IFANS, Asia Pacific Leadership Network (APLN), Nautilus Institute
- **Sponsors:** ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Open Society Foundations, Ploughshares Fund

Program (tentative)

	<i>December 10th (Wed.), 18:30-20:00</i>
	<i>Namsan Room, Grand Hyatt Seoul</i>

WELCOME RECEPTION AND DINNER

18:30-20:00 Hosted by Amb. **CHO Byung-jae**
Chancellor of KNDA, Republic of Korea

<i>Day 1</i>	<i>December 11th (Mon.), 10:00-17:40</i>
	<i>Auditorium (1F), KNDA</i>

OPENING SESSION

09:00-10:00 **Registration**

Opening Remarks

10:00-10:10

CHO Byung-jae
Chancellor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy Republic of Korea

Keynote Speech

10:10-10:30

KANG Kyung-wha
Foreign Minister, Republic of Korea

10:30-10:35 Photo session

Comprehensive Moves Toward a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula

10:35-10:50 Break

SESSION I

Resolving North Korean Nuclear Problem through International Collaboration

Special Speech

10:50-11:30
(40 mins.)

Colin POWELL
General, USA(Ret.)(Secretary of State 2001-2005)

Kevin RUDD
Former Prime Minister of Australia

11:30-11:40 Intermission

Panel Discussion

Moderator

MOON Chung-in

Special Adviser to the President for Foreign Affairs and National Security, Republic of Korea
(Distinguished University Professor, Yonsei University)

11:40-12:20

Panelists

(40 mins.)

Colin POWELL

State General, USA(Ret.)(Secretary of State 2001-2005)

Kevin RUDD

Former Prime Minister of Australia

Thomas PICKERING

Former U.S. Under Secretary of State (Vice Chairman, Hills & Co.)

December 11th (Mon.), 12:30-14:00

KNDA Club (2F), KNDA

LUNCHEON

12:30-14:00 **Luncheon Speech**

(90 mins.)

LEE Do-hoon

Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea

SESSION II

Untangling North Korean Nuclear and Missile Quagmire:

Kim Jung-un's Intention, Capability and Strategy

Moderator

PAIK Ji-ah

President, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, KNDA

Panelists

HONG Ihk-Pyo

Member of National Assembly (The Minjoo Party of Korea), Republic of Korea

14:00-15:40

Leon SIGAL

Director, Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project, Social Science Research Council

(100 mins.)

YANG Xiyu

Senior Fellow, China Institute of International Studies

ABE Nobuyasu

Commissioner, Japan Atomic Energy Commission

Georgy TOLORAYA

Director, Asian Strategy Center, Institute of Economy, Russian Academy of Sciences

Kasit PIROMYA

Former Foreign Minister of Thailand

15:40-16:00 Coffee Break

SESSION III

Dealing with North Korean Problem: Lessons Learned and Devising a New Approach

Moderator

YOON Young-kwan

professor Emeritus, Seoul National University(Former Foreign Minister, Republic of Korea)

Panelists

JUN Bong-Geun

Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy

Morton HALPERIN

Senior Advisor, Open Society Foundations

Peter HAYES

Director, [Nautilus Institute](#)

K.A. Tony NAMKUNG

Senior Advisor, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

PAN Zhenqiang

Senior advisor, China Reform Forum

NYAM-OSOR Tuya

Former Foreign Minister of Mongolia

Alexander VORONTSOV

Comprehensive Moves Toward a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula

Head, Department for Korean and Mongolian Studies, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

December 11th (Mon.), 19:30-21:00

Sansoo Room, Grand Hyatt Seoul

DINNER

19:30-21:00

Dinner Speech

CHOI Jong Kun

Secretary to the President for Peace and Arms Control, National Security Office, ROK

Chair

KIM Ki-jung

Professor, Yonsei University

Presenters

“Reading Kim Jong-un’s Lips: what is his playbook and intention?”

Patrick MCEACHERN

International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

“The Trump Factor” (five minutes each)

Philip YUN

Executive Director & Chief Operating Officer, Ploughshares Fund

Thomas PICKERING

Former U.S. Under Secretary of State(Vice Chairman, Hills &Co)

Leon SIGAL

Director, Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project, Social Science Research Council

Morton HALPERIN

Senior Advisor, Open Society Foundations

Commentators

Comprehensive Moves Toward a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula

HWANG Il-do

Assistant Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy

KIM Jina

Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

Q&A and Dialogue

LUNCHEON (Venue: KNDA Club, 2nd floor of KNDA)

11:40-13:00

(80 mins.)

LUNCHEON (Venue: KNDA Club, 2nd floor of KNDA)

SESSION II

Critical Obstacles to and Opportunities for Phased Nuclear Settlement

Chair

MA Sang-Yoon

Director-General for Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea

13:00-14:40

Presenters

“North Korea’s conventional deterrent: update for 300mm MRL system”

Peter ZIMMERMAN

Emeritus Professor, King’s College

“DPRK energy insecurity and oil sanctions to DPRK and regional energy security”

David von HIPPEL

Senior Associate, Nautilus Institute

Commentators

YOON Jae Young

Executive Director of Advanced Power Grid Research Division , Korea Electrotechnology Research Institute

PARK Jiyong

Senior Research Fellow, Asan Institute for Policy Studies

14:00-14:40

Q&A and Dialogue

Comprehensive Moves Toward a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula

14:40-15:00 Coffee Break

SESSION III

Developing Joint Concepts and Strategies for Implementation

15:00-16:40
(100 mins.) **Chair**
Ramesh THAKUR
Professor, Australian National University (Co-Convener, Asia Pacific Leadership Network)

Open Dialogue

16:40-17:00 **Closing Remarks**
PAIK Ji-ah
President, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, KNDA

Comprehensive Moves Toward a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula

Attachment 2

See the video of the 2017 IFANS Conference:

<http://www.ifans.go.kr/knda/ifans/eng/mvp/MvpList.do;jsessionid=MpHiVF1gkotgK3LgvNcUQ5-d.public12?searchMvpSe=VOD3>

Watch it on YouTube:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUWgD7X3dP0> or https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=2017+ifans+conference

Photos



Cho Byung-jae, Delivering Opening Remarks, Auditorium, KNDA, December 11.

Comprehensive Moves Toward a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula



Gathered delegates, Opening session, Auditorium, KNDA, December 11, 2017.



Kang Kyung-wha, delivering Keynote Speech, Opening Session, December 11, 2017.

Comprehensive Moves Toward a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula



Kevin Rudd, Auditorium, KNDA, December 11, 2017, Session I.



Lee Do-hoon, Luncheon Speech, KNDA Club, KNDA, December 11, 2017.

Comprehensive Moves Toward a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula



From left to right: Colin Powell, Cho Byung-jae, Kevin Rudd, Kang Kyung-wha, Opening Session, Auditorium, KNDA, December 11, 2017.



Registration session, KNDA, December 11, 2017.

Comprehensive Moves Toward a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula



From left to right: Chung-in Moon, moderator; former US Secretary of State General Colin Powell; former Prime Minister Australia Kevin Rudd; former US Assistant Secretary of State Ambassador Thomas Pickering, panel discussion “Resolving North Korean Nuclear Problem through International Collaboration” December 11, 2017.



From left to right: Paik Ji-ah, Hong Ihk-Pyo, Leon Sigal, Yang Xiyu, Abe Nobuyasu, Georgy Toloraya, Kasit Piromya, December 11, 2017, Auditorium, KNDA, Session II.

Comprehensive Moves Toward a Nuclear-free Korean Peninsula



From left to right: Yoon Young-kwan, Jun Bong-guen, Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes, K.A. Tony Namkung, Pan Zhenqiang, Nyam-Osor Tuya, Alexander Vorontzov, Auditorium, KNDA, December 11, 2017, Session III.



Group Photo, Auditorium, KNDA, December 11, 2017.

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Attendees and presenters, Auditorium, KNDA, Opening Session, December 11, 2017.



Group photo, Closed Roundtable, International Conference Room, December 12, 2017.