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Statement on Nuclear Security

1. The Nuclear Security Summits, held in Washington in 2010 and Seoul on 26-27 March 2012, have been valuable in ensuring the engagement of world leaders in an area usually left to specialists. However, they have shown how much remains to be done to strengthen nuclear security around the world – and the inadequate information presently available on national performance in this area.
2. International governance in nuclear security remains weak compared with the disciplines of safeguards and nuclear safety. It is essential to achieve the right balance between national sovereignty and the international interest. The Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents demonstrated that *an accident anywhere is an accident everywhere*. The international interest for national activities to be managed effectively is indisputable. This is just as true for nuclear security as it is for nuclear safety.
3. APLN members call upon governments to take the following steps to strengthen nuclear security internationally.

One: Universalise the existing nuclear treaties without delay

The principal nuclear security treaties are the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)¹, the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM² and the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.³

Every effort needs be made to universalise these Conventions, and to bring the 2005 CPPNM Amendment into effect without further delay. Governments outside the CPPNM or its Amendment, or the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, should make joining a high priority. Existing parties should do all they can to encourage and assist others to join.

Two: Establish binding nuclear security standards

The CPPNM establishes broad security standards. More detailed standards are set out in the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) nuclear security recommendations, but these are only recommendations, with no binding force. With no binding standards, security practice varies considerably from state to state. With no requirement for reporting and external review it is difficult to identify which states need support in improving their security performance. Establishment of binding nuclear security standards must be given high priority.

¹ The CPPNM entered into force in 1987, and has 145 parties. While this is three-quarters of the world's states, it still leaves a quarter – a sizeable number of states – as non-parties. Despite all the attention now given to nuclear security, the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM is still not in force. Seven years after being opened for accession, it has just over half the number of accessions required for this.

² The 2005 Amendment is important because, inter alia, it extends obligations of the 1980 CPPNM, which largely related to nuclear material in international transport, to domestic application, and extends the scope of the Convention to also cover protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage.

³ The Nuclear Terrorism Convention entered into force in July 2007 and currently has 79 parties.

Three: Establish mechanisms for transparency, reporting and accountability

There is currently no international *reporting mechanism* by which states can show they are observing the terms of the CPPNM, the Amended CPPNM, and the IAEA's nuclear security recommendations. A reporting procedure should be developed, by the IAEA as the Convention Depository, or if necessary through a further amendment to the Convention. An amendment could also provide for periodic review conferences.

Nor is there currently any requirement for states to accept *external review* of nuclear security performance, whether by international inspections or mandatory peer reviews.⁴ External review is not simply a matter of monitoring compliance, but an essential check against vulnerabilities that national authorities may have missed.

A voluntary peer review system is too weak. For nuclear safety the members of WANO (World Association of Nuclear Operators) have agreed to mandatory peer reviews, and there is no reason why the same should not apply in nuclear security. Procedures can be established that protect sensitive information. States should be committed to implement the results of peer review, or explain if they don't accept them. For the future, governments should give serious consideration to introducing international security inspections.

Four: Strengthen the role of the IAEA

It is a matter of serious concern that the IAEA's regular budget continues to be insufficient for its nuclear security activities, and that most funding for this area comes from voluntary contributions. This is despite the Agency's increasing responsibilities in nuclear security. The IAEA's nuclear security funding should be regularised at the level needed to meet new demands. Governments should also look constructively at giving the IAEA a stronger role through concluding agreements with the Agency covering nuclear security functions.

4. These issues should be progressed as part of the preparations for the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands. If the Summit process is unable to progress these issues, there will be a need for a group of states willing to provide leadership on these matters. Governments in the Asia Pacific region should consider developing a regional approach that could set an example for others.

SIGNED

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⁴ There are only voluntary peer review schemes operated by the IAEA and the non-government World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS).

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