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Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation in the Pacific

Becky Alexis-Martin, Qurat Ul Ain, Kolby Kaller, Ben Donaldson, and Matthew Maslen

Abstract

This report provides insight into the benefits and challenges pertaining to victim assistance and environmental remediation in the wake of nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific. Nuclear weapons were tested by the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and France across historical colonial and occupied commonwealth lands in the Pacific Ocean from 1946 until 1996.1 Australia, Republic of Kiribati, Marshall Islands, and French Polynesia were directly affected and experienced significant humanitarian and environmental consequences. Other nearby Pacific Island states, including Cook Islands, Fiji, and Solomon Islands were also impacted by the tests. While evidence of environmental and health effects exists, the total long-term consequences remain unknown. Nuclear weapons possessor states are reluctant to accept responsibility for harms and are unwilling to provide transparency around historical nuclear military activity. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) offers a path forward to understand the impacts of Pacific nuclear weapons testing and to support nation-states affected by these activities. Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty provide a framework for addressing the humanitarian and environmental consequences and an avenue for international collaboration towards these ends.

This report highlights the potential local and grassroots benefits of the Treaty to Pacific nations and recommends that Pasifika people are supported to engage with the decision-making process at every stage of its development and implementation. We recommend that mechanisms and safeguards are in place, including long-term support, monitoring, auditing, and education, to ensure access to support is equitable and fair. We recommend that Articles 6 and 7 are implemented through a lens of epistemic justice, which is justice of knowledge, and frameworks must be established to ensure parity of understanding among relevant Pacific communities, through translation of key materials into non-colonial languages and establishing community networks and mentors.

We also recommend that any international aid mobilised through the Treaty, whether financial or otherwise, is accessible to all affected communities, regardless of whether they reside in a TPNW State Party. Importantly, Pasifika people must be supported in their practices of recognition, acknowledgement, and memorialisation to address psycho-social and cultural consequences of the nuclear weapons test programs; policy interventions should acknowledge the intrinsic value that many Pacific peoples place on the environment, not just its instrumental value, and nuclear testing victims must receive comprehensive biopsychosocial medical support. Finally, a complete and detailed environmental, genetic, and public health study, led by international experts in the field, is necessary to ascertain and secure future needs, and to understand the true legacy of nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific.

Introduction to Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Pacific

The main sites of nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific are Australia, Marshall Islands, French Polynesia, and Kiritimati (Christmas Island). This section introduces these nuclear weapons tests and their humanitarian and environmental consequences.

Figure 1: Map of nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific (Adapted by Waddingham 2017).

The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI)

From 1946 to 1958, the United States detonated sixty-seven nuclear devices in the air, sea, and land of Marshall Islands. The first series of tests, codenamed Operation Crossroads, included the bomb Baker, whose widespread contamination has been referred to as the world’s first nuclear disaster. The second series, Operation Castle, included the largest thermonuclear bomb ever detonated by the United States. The scientists behind the detonation of Castle Bravo vastly underestimated the expected yield of the nuclear explosion, which, at 1,000 times the strength of either of the atomic bombs dropped on Japan during World War II, destroyed many of the instruments designed to evaluate its potency. Nuclear fallout rained down on inhabitants of nearby atolls. On Rongelap Atoll, unaware of the nuclear test, islanders mistook the radioactive powder for snow and played in it. Traces of radioactive material spread as far as Australia, India, Japan, and parts of the United State and Europe.

During the testing, the United States temporarily relocated 167 inhabitants of Bikini Atoll to the uninhabited Rongerik Atoll. Though the Bikinians were promised a prompt return home, the United States continued to detonate an additional twenty-one nuclear bombs from 1954 to 1958. As a result, the islanders stayed on the uninhabited atoll for two years, with inadequate food and water supply which led to cries of starvation, before they were eventually relocated to a nearby island. A subpopulation of those displaced returned to Bikini Atoll in the 1970s and 1980s; however, due to health issues resulting from exposure to radioactive materials, they had to be evacuated a second time. Even though the United States concluded its testing regime in Marshall Islands in 1958, the radiological legacy of these activities endures.

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6 Rowberry, "Castle Bravo."

7 Becky Alexis-Martin, "Nuclear warfare and weather (im) mobilities: From mushroom clouds to fallout," in *Weather: Spaces, Mobilities and Affects*, ed. Kaya Barry, Maria Borovnik, Tim Edensor (Routledge, 2020), 236-249

French Polynesia

From 1966 to 1996, France conducted 193 nuclear explosions in French Polynesia, primarily at sites located within the Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls. The first bomb, codenamed Aldébaran, reportedly spread contamination across the Pacific as far as Peru and New Zealand. As a result of the 193 nuclear tests, including forty-one atmospheric explosions, Fangataufa remains permanently uninhabited with unauthorised entry prohibited, and locals on the other islands have recorded higher cases of breast and thyroid cancers.

Early on, the tests sparked international debate. After New Zealand sent two frigates to protest for a nuclear-free Pacific in 1973, France responded by moving operations underground. From 1974 onwards, the country abandoned atmospheric nuclear testing in favour of underground testing. Protests persisted; slightly over a decade later, an environmental activist ship stopped in New Zealand on its way to protest a planned nuclear test in Mururoa. In an act of state terrorism, French secret agents bombed the ship, sinking it and killing one of the activists.

In the wake of the 30-year testing program, domestic and international calls demanding greater transparency arose. In 2005, French Polynesia’s then President Oscar Temaru accused the French government of continuing to cover up the human health and environmental impacts of the operations, noting ongoing elevated levels of radioactive contamination. Temaru claimed the French Ministry of Defence was refusing to cooperate with his commission of inquiry by keeping relevant files secret. The following year, the commission presented its report, asserting that classified defence information from 1965 to 1967 showed France had lied to the local population about the consequences they would face from the open-air tests. In recent years, researchers have found more evidence that France concealed the true impact of its testing program. Calling on declassified military documents and testimonies to recreate the impact of many of the tests, the investigation revealed around 110,000 people were contaminated by radioactive fallout.


Furthermore, the radiation from the tests was between two and ten times higher than estimates provided by France’s Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) in its 2006 report.

**Kiritimati (Republic of Kiribati)**

Between 1957 and 1962, the United Kingdom and the United States conducted thirty-three atmospheric nuclear tests on what is now the Republic of Kiribati. During the testing period, the land was under UK colonial control, and, following the UK tests, it was “lent” by the United Kingdom to the United States for further tests. The first three tests took place at Malden Island with the remaining thirty at Kiritimati. The British phase, Operation Grapple, took place from 1957 to 1958 and comprised three detonations on Malden Island and six detonations at Kiritimati with a total yield of just under eight megatons. The US testing at Kiritimati, part of Operation Dominic, comprised twenty-four detonations with a total yield of around twenty-two megatons. The total yield of British and American testing on Kiribati territory was around thirty megatons – 750 times the power of the combined bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

In 1962, as part of Operation Dominic, Palmyra Atoll was a monitoring site for atmospheric nuclear tests. The Atoll is one of the Northern Line Islands, located south of Hawaii. It was one of six secondary monitoring stations during the operation, chosen as it was estimated that there was a “fair probability that some measurable fallout might occur.” On three occasions in 1962, Palmyra was exposed to “measurable air concentrations.” All three occasions were the result of fallout from airburst tests carried out on Kiritimati.

An ever-more permissive approach to safety standards for Pacific peoples is evident throughout the testing period. Islanders were put at risk of exposure to radioactivity in multiple ways, including through residual radioactivity present on the island and contamination of foodstuffs such as fish upon which local populations relied. The 500 I-Kiribati civilians, living on Kiritimati at the time of the testing, received little protection during the tests and no support afterwards.


18 Ibid., 119.

British, Fijian, New Zealand, and US veterans of the testing program and I-Kiribati civilians who lived on Kiritimati claim their health was adversely affected by exposure to ionising radiation. However, analysis of the ongoing humanitarian, human rights, and environmental impact of nuclear weapons testing at Kiritimati and Malden Island has been inadequate.20

The UK Government shared little information with Pacific communities ahead of and during the tests. “Publicity must be kept under strict control” was the United Kingdom’s approach.21 The Pacific community’s requests for more information remain unfulfilled.

**Australia**

From 1952 to 1963, there were twelve major tests and two hundred so-called “minor trials” in Australia.22 As part of a broader British nuclear weapons development programme, the Australian Government permitted the British military to use three sites: Montebello Islands off Western Australia, and Emu Field and Maralinga in South Australia. There were five operations – Operation Hurricane, Operation Totem, Operation Mosaic, Operation Buffalo, and Operation Antler – which assessed the performance of weapons components and investigated safety issues.

None of the British tests adequately considered the consequences to the indigenous Anangu Pitjantjatjara people, or the greater risk of radiation exposure faced by families living in the outback. For example, the minor trials at Maralinga, two of which involved burning plutonium and detonating fissile material using conventional high explosives, caused plutonium contamination in the environment. Just one native patrol officer, Walter MacDougall, was responsible for covering hundreds of thousands of square kilometres by car to support the local community.

Australian authorities did not discover the extent of the contamination at Maralinga until 1984, before the land was returned to its Aboriginal owners.23


The tests had significant environmental and health impacts on Indigenous populations and military personnel, leading to long-standing controversies and legal battles about compensation and clean-up efforts. The Australian government has since apologised for the impacts of the tests, but communities continue to remain unsupported.

The Role of the TPNW in Providing Humanitarian Assistance

At the time of writing this paper, there are seventy States Parties to the TPNW. The TPNW’s positive obligations, on victim assistance and environmental remediation (Article 6) and international cooperation and assistance (Article 7), provide a framework for the delivery of tangible benefits to affected communities. Article 6 places a legal obligation on States Parties to provide medical care, rehabilitation, and psychological support, while addressing social and economic needs, to all affected individuals under its jurisdiction without discrimination. It also commits States Parties to implement environmental remediation measures in contaminated areas. Under Article 7, all States Parties in a position to do so must assist affected States Parties in the fulfilment of their Article 6 obligations on victim assistance and environmental remediation – this could include financial resources, scientific expertise, information, diplomatic support, recognition, and acknowledgement – to help communities affected by nuclear weapons testing. Article 7 also provides for states to offer direct assistance to victims of nuclear testing.

Because Kazakhstan, Kiribati, New Zealand, and Fiji – all of whom identify as having been affected by nuclear weapons — are States Parties to the TPNW, whereas nuclear weapons states are not, the TPNW enables affected states – rather than nuclear-armed states – to shape global victim assistance and environmental remediation policy. This allows the broadening of what is conventionally considered to constitute a ‘victim’ and of assessments made about previously overlooked impacts, including those in areas where fallout from nuclear testing has historically been denied by nuclear weapons states. This approach is expected to also enable a reduced burden of evidentiary proof for the victim.

25 Minor, “Addressing Nuclear Harm.”
Key Features of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2017)

• **Recognition of humanitarian consequences**: The TPNW has elevated diplomatic awareness around the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from any detonation of nuclear weapons. This recognition underscores the importance of preventative measures to avoid the creation of new impacted populations.

• **Victim assistance and environmental remediation**: The Treaty places an emphasis on assisting individuals affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, as well as on environmental remediation. This includes providing medical care, rehabilitation, and psychological support to victims, as well as addressing the long-term environmental effects of nuclear explosions.

• **International cooperation**: The TPNW commits States Parties to cooperate with one another to address the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. It also obligates all States Parties who can to provide assistance to affected communities, encouraging a collective and collaborative approach.

• **Promotion of humanitarian principles**: By prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and promoting their elimination, the TPNW aligns with fundamental humanitarian principles, including the protection of civilians and the minimisation of human suffering in armed conflicts.

• **Stigmatisation of nuclear weapons**: The Treaty contributes to the stigmatisation, making nuclear weapons unacceptable under international law. Stigmatisation strengthens the nuclear taboo, contributing to disarmament by increasing the political cost of ownership while reducing the likelihood of their use.
1. Assessing Needs and Addressing Harm

The TPNW is not the only avenue to address the harms caused by nuclear weapons testing; however, pre-existing arrangements for communities affected in the Pacific region appear inadequate. Additionally, while communities affected by nuclear weapons live in countries outside of the jurisdiction of the Treaty, there is a risk that assistance may not be equally accessible to all those in need.

This section outlines pre-existing remediation measures, the obstacles involved, and the different implications for the four affected territories featured in this report and their different relationships with the TPNW.

The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI)

The Marshallese government has publicly denounced the use and testing of nuclear weapons, and in 2014, attempted to sue the United States and eight other nuclear countries under a “Nuclear Zero Lawsuit,” arguing the actors had not made sufficient moves towards disarmament. Nonetheless, the RMI has not joined the TPNW. This must be considered within the context of the RMI’s Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the United States. First established in 1983, the agreement grants Marshallese citizens certain economic and military privileges in exchange for, among other stipulations, permission for the United States to operate armed forces within its territory. As this includes testing of nuclear-capable inter-continental ballistic missiles, COFA is regarded as incompatible with the TPNW. Although the implementation of COFA has been subject to repeated criticism for its inadequate response to the impacts of nuclear testing, the RMI and other states with similar arrangements with the United States signed a 20-year renewal in 2023. During this period, the United States has promised to provide an additional $2.3 billion in funding. Consequently, Marshallese leaders appear to be unable to join the TPNW at present.

A particular factor for RMI is the knowledge gap in relation to the US tests. In the days following the Castle Bravo test, the United States established covert operations to evaluate the medical effects of radioactive fallout on residents of Marshall Islands. The United States was later accused of using inhabitants as

medical research subjects without consent. This initial clandestine interest in capturing medical information did not graduate to a transparent long-term study on the health impacts. For decades, the Marshallese have called for more legitimate, transparent research into the longstanding impacts of nuclear activities. As an example of the shortcomings of current research, in 2022, the Scientific American published a report critiquing the US Department of Energy (DOE) for relying on studies conducted using simulations rather than direct measurements of gamma radiation. The authors of the report note that the magazine’s independent research presented contrary findings to the DOE’s tests.

The most visually striking legacy of the RMI’s nuclear history is the Runit Dome. The concrete structure, which holds an estimated 73,000 m$^3$ of radioactive debris, is currently at risk of collapse due to weathering and rising sea levels. A 2019 investigation by the LA Times found that US military personnel had recognised that radioactive material was leaking from Runit Dome as far back as the 1970s, yet they did not alert local authorities. Amid concerns the whole dome may break open if left in its current state, the United States denies responsibility for waste material that is not on its soil. Article 7 of the TPNW calls for international cooperation and assistance among States Parties that have ratified the Treaty. This call for shared responsibility empowers States Parties impacted by nuclear testing programs to take responsibility in remediation efforts without relying on the assistance of the States responsible for the test programs, while at the same time ensuring the burden does not fall solely on the affected parties. While addressing the concerns regarding Runit Dome may span beyond the resources the RMI can feasibly allocate within its own national budget, these calls for cooperation may be the means through which Marshallese leadership can pre-empt the looming environmental disaster of the dome’s collapse.

**French Polynesia**

French Polynesia is an overseas territory of France and therefore, cannot itself become a State Party to the TPNW. In September 2023, the assembly of French Polynesia unanimously adopted a resolution in support of the TPNW while


calling on France to join the Treaty.\textsuperscript{32} In 2010, France established a commission for compensating civil and military victims of atomic testing. Independent researchers, however, have argued that the process that French Polynesians are required to undergo to meet the burden of proof to be recognised as a victim under the commission, known as CIVEN, is akin to climbing an unscalable wall.\textsuperscript{33} CIVEN rejects over 80% of the cases it receives without offering justification.

In a striking example of the need for greater transparency into the criteria for obtaining victim status, two sisters, born one year apart, had both developed breast cancer. Though their cases contain identical stories, one sister was granted victim status while the other was not.\textsuperscript{34} Aware of the highly selective and apparently arbitrary nature of the process, many islanders forgo applying for assistance altogether. Given the inaccessible nature of existing support and compensation schemes, many French Polynesians remain in need of support.

Decades of nuclear testing have left an enduring mark on the territory’s natural environment. Though France’s Atomic Energy Commission and defence personnel have carried out environmental sampling to monitor radiological impacts since 1998, there is a clear need for independent investigations, given France’s history of misrepresenting test results.

**Kiritimati**

In September 2017, the Republic of Kiribati, which Kiritimati is a part of, signed the TPNW. In 2019, it went on to ratify it.\textsuperscript{35} A month after the Treaty entered into force, in February 2021, the state submitted a declaration that it neither owns, possesses, nor controls nuclear weapons, never has done, and does not host any other states.\textsuperscript{36} Kiribati intends to be the first nation state to provide full reporting though the TPNW framework.

While US veterans that develop any of the twenty-one presumptive cancers are eligible for compensation, the same right is not extended to i-Kiribati citizens.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{32} "French Polynesia Calls on France to Join UN Nuclear Ban Treaty," International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), accessed March 1, 2024, \url{https://www.icanw.org/french_polynesia_calls_on_france_to_join_un_nuclear_ban_treaty#--text=The%20assembly%20of%20French%20Polynesia%20powers%2C%20to%20join%20the%20treaty}

\textsuperscript{33} "The Compensation Trap," Moruroa Files.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{36} FAI:51/164/029 Kiribati US correspondence, \url{https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Kiribati-public-received-2021-02-20.pdf}

\textsuperscript{37} Becky Alexis-Martin et al., "Addressing the Humanitarian and Environmental Consequences of Atmospheric Nuclear Weapon Tests: A Case Study of UK and US Test Programs at Kiritimati (Christmas)and Malden Islands, Republic of Kiribati," *Global Policy* 12, no. 1 (February 2021): 106–21, \url{https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12913}
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, continues to refuse compensation to either i-Kiribati citizens or British military personnel.38

Both the United States and the British Governments have argued that the monitoring that they conducted during their nuclear testing programmes was thorough and sufficient.39 Further tests were also undertaken in the following decades, examining residual contamination; however, the levels discovered were found to be not necessarily the result of US and UK nuclear testing.40 Yet, the major studies done in the area were not carried out independently; rather, they were funded directly by the US and UK governments.41 Furthermore, the results of these reports are not public information, rendering the citizens of Kirimitimati uncertain of the lasting humanitarian impacts from US and UK nuclear testing.42 Dozens of documents held at the United Kingdom’s National Archives at Kew relating to the United Kingdom’s nuclear testing in Kiribati remain classified, and a UK Minister recently announced it has no plans to respond to Kiribati’s requests for information or compensation.43

The inaccessibility of knowledge significantly hampers the ability to understand what took place on Kiribati, impeding the work of the Kiribati Government, academia, and civil society, all of whom are collaborating to address the impact of the tests through the TPNW.44

**Australia**

As of 2024, Australia has not ratified the TPNW. The Australian government announced in 2023 that it “is considering the TPNW systematically and methodically as part of [their] ambitious agenda to advance nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.”45 This marked a further move away from Australia’s initial opposition to the TPNW from 2018 to 2021.

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38 Ibid., 116.
41 Ibid., 114.
42 Of the eight radiological surveys mentioned in Dr. Bolton’s research, including those commissioned by the UK, US and New Zealand Governments, only one is publicly available (M. Bolton 2018).
45 "Australia," International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), accessed March 1, 2024, [https://www.icann.org/australia](https://www.icann.org/australia)
The British government has, to date, not provided compensation to victims of nuclear testing in Australia. In 1993, the Australian and UK governments funded a clean-up of the contaminated lands at Maralinga. However, the Australian government only received an agreement from the United Kingdom to help fund the process after threatening to take them to the International Court of Justice. Even after this, the Australian government was forced to accept $A49 million less than they had originally asked for.46

Australia’s reservations to joining the TPNW are partly based on the belief that signing the Treaty is incompatible with the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS).47 It has been argued that, to join the TPNW, Australia would first have to reject ANZUS which brings it under the United States extended nuclear deterrence policy and supports it through the states’ joint defence facility ‘Pine Gap’.48 However, there is no reference to nuclear weapons in ANZUS.49 Furthermore, the TPNW does not disallow States Parties to remain in military alliances with nuclear weapons states.50

2. Designing and Implementing a Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation Trust Fund

The first step towards operationalising Articles 6 and 7 is for affected State Parties to submit an initial assessment on the humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons on their territory, and the anticipated resources required to respond.51 As such, there must be a United Nations (UN) TPNW process and adequate support for state parties that lack sufficient national capacity to conduct an initial assessment. These initial voluntary reports will guide the creation of national infrastructure, oversight mechanisms, timelines, and critically for the purpose of the trust fund: budgets.


48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.


A vital device to support the international assistance envisaged in Article 7 is the development of a voluntary international trust fund to finance the needs identified in national assessments that cannot be met in a national capacity.\textsuperscript{52} At the first Meeting of States Parties in 2022, States Parties established an informal working group which discussed the feasibility of and possible guidelines for establishing the fund.\textsuperscript{53} The group met regularly in the intersessional period and, guided by its report, at the second Meeting of States Parties in 2023, they opted to continue discussions on the establishment of a fund.\textsuperscript{54} While states appear confident that the fund will be created at 3MSP, scheduled for March 2025, protracted discussions on the matter belie divisions on how the fund should operate.

The key questions that the states are attempting to reconcile in the current intersessional period include, (a) who should be permitted to contribute to a trust fund? (b) who should be eligible to receive grants from the trust fund?\textsuperscript{55} \textsuperscript{56}

**A. Who should be permitted to contribute to a trust fund for nuclear victims?**

Many States Parties and civil society organisations believe that to maximise the potential for donations, non-States Parties, as well as international organisations, civil society, and private donors should be able to contribute. Others, including Fiji and South Africa, have suggested that the fund should be limited to States Parties, lest non-States Parties exert undue control or interact through the trust fund as a substitute for formally joining the Treaty.\textsuperscript{57} The total cost of conducting

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remediation work across all affected sites remains unknown. However, given that the activities required to assess needs alone will require significant resources to be effective, the trust fund will need to attract significant funding. The lack of major overseas aid donors within the States Parties of the TPNW suggests that a permissive approach to funding sources will be essential and consistent with several other international trust funds.\textsuperscript{58} A 2023 United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution, on the need to take action to assist the victims of nuclear testing, was supported by the overwhelming majority of UN member states, with over 100 states not party to the TPNW, suggesting there may be widespread appetite for feeding into this fund. More broadly, the ability to consider a wider range of fundraising options and to connect with major fundraising mobilisations, such as the Bridgetown Financing for Development initiative, could improve the scope of the articles.

Safeguards should be established to protect against undue donor influence and to ensure that the administration of the fund is retained within the TPNW community. The fund should establish an inclusive, multi-stakeholder governance model comprising affected communities (from both within and outside TPNW States Parties) and independent civil society experts as well as representatives of States Parties.

\textbf{B. Who should be eligible to receive grants from the trust fund?}

The asymmetrical relationship with the TPNW that countries in which affected communities reside experience, due to their reliance on support from other States Parties, raises questions about the distribution of assistance channelled through Article 7. While the first three provisions relate to assistance given by States Parties to States Parties, the fourth provision is broader, simply committing States Parties, where possible, to provide assistance “for the victims of the use or testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” This is significant for affected communities in territories outside the TPNW’s jurisdiction since it means the trust fund could be set up to distribute resources to these individuals.

While States Parties are yet to decide on the eligibility criteria of recipients for the proposed fund, civil society reporting on state discussions suggest that the funding of affected States Parties will be prioritised.\textsuperscript{59} In the Pacific region, of the four territories considered in this report, just one (Kiribati) is a TPNW State Party. Around 80% (122 megatons) of the total yield across these four territories was

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.

detonated in non-TPNW States Parties, with around 20% (31 megatons) in Kiribati. The case for a non-discriminatory, needs-based distribution through Article 7 is strong. Tests took place on lands appropriated by nuclear weapons states without the consent of indigenous populations – territory that remains largely outside the jurisdiction of the Treaty despite strong local support for the TPNW. For French Polynesian communities, the power to decide to participate in the TPNW’s work resides with the central Government based in Paris – the same authority that inflicted the harm. For RMI, the power dynamic is similar, with essential bilateral income dependent on a military alliance with the United States, which precludes RMI’s accession to the TPNW. In the case of Australia, despite public support for the Treaty, the Government has not yet joined, apparently due to pressure from the United States.60

C. Double jeopardy: blockage at the governmental level

If the public health needs of affected indigenous communities are selectively addressed depending on their government’s relationship with the TPNW, their health will yet again be put in jeopardy based on the influence of nuclear weapons states. Without a victims-sensitive, needs-first approach, the work of the Treaty could inadvertently deepen inequalities by leaving certain affected communities behind through no fault of their own. The continued role of nuclear states in this equation resembles elements of nuclear colonialism and risks the exclusion of communities with complex needs that have themselves been integral to the Treaty’s creation and continue to shape the Treaty’s work.61

Conclusions and Recommendations

The harms caused to Pacific territories and Pasifika peoples due to nuclear weapons are varied, wide-ranging, and ongoing. The lives of affected communities continue to be severely impacted by nuclear testing, including through (but not limited to) the health effects of exposure to ionising radiation, intergenerational impacts, land degradation, landscape change, forced displacement, lack of access to lands, habitat loss, and damage to food systems. Victims seek not only medical assistance, but also support for practices of recognition, acknowledgement, and memorialisation to address psycho-social and cultural consequences of the nuclear weapons test programs.

60 “Australia,” ICAN webpage, accessed April 1, 2024, https://www.icanw.org/australia
While there is an ample body of evidence, including independent medical and environmental assessments to support these findings, the full extent of the humanitarian and environmental consequences remains under-assessed and the level of knowledge, inadequate.

Furthermore, a clear pattern of conduct characterises the approaches of nuclear weapons states that tested in the region – France, United Kingdom, United States — which include a lack of transparency with respect to their operations in the region, the denial of access to archival records, non-existent or inadequate compensation programmes, and a lack of engagement with the TPNW, despite their invitation to participate as Observer states. The underlying discrimination which facilitated the appropriation and devastation of far-off lands appears to persist to the present day, not only through the prevailing lack of recognition and dismissal of the TPNW, but also through the increased level of medical care and compensation afforded their own citizens who experienced the tests (which itself remains inadequate and in some cases, non-existent) in comparison to indigenous Pacific peoples.

The TPNW presents an important new avenue for addressing the consequences of nuclear detonations in the Pacific region and beyond, and one which does not rely on the participation of nuclear weapons states. A tangible benefit of the Treaty relates to the work in preparation by States Parties under Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty on victim assistance and environmental remediation, and international cooperation towards these aims. Whereas in the past, remediation efforts have often been conducted by the relevant nuclear weapons testing state, the TPNW empowers affected states to take ownership of remediation efforts and to build the relevant national capacity and infrastructure, supported by members of the international community. Such ownership can help to overcome the dynamic of epistemic injustice perpetuated by nuclear weapons states.

Field work conducted by co-author Dr Alexis-Martin in Kiritimati in July and August 2023 has identified a significant appetite for affected communities to engage closely with the design of remediation efforts and therefore, measures should be put in at an early stage to raise the level of knowledge about the opportunities presented by the TPNW as well as to remove barriers to participation with respect to needs assessments and the co-design of remediation actions.62 This research focused on community understanding and desired outcomes from the TPNW in Kiritimati. Six workshops on the TPNW and ways to engage were delivered to 175 participants in English and I-Kiribati, and interviews were undertaken with local government and community leaders to discern community desire and interest in participation in global policymaking.

Community training offered opportunities for local people to become TPNW experts and leaders, improving local autonomy in the context of any decisions made about the future of Kiritimati. One of the outcomes of the project was the presentation of five young Kiritimati women at the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to share their thoughts and perspectives on the Treaty. Other outcomes include a deeper appreciation of community needs, such as better medical, environmental, and older people’s support on the island for survivors.

The inclusive nature of the TPNW offers hope that the “nothing about us, without us” principle can be applied at all stages in the operationalisation of Articles 6 and 7.

The creation of an international trust fund, currently under discussion by States Parties to the TPNW, will be vital to realising the promise of Articles 6 and 7. Given the infrastructure and capacity building requirements, as well as the anticipated direct costs of remediation programmes, it is essential that the trust will be able to attract significant funding. To facilitate this, a wide variety of donors should be eligible to contribute, including States Parties, non-States Parties, international organisations, foundations, and private finance. Legitimate arguments that such an approach may remove incentives for non-States Parties to join the Treaty and/or give rise to undesirable donor influence should be mitigated through robust governance structures that ensures that the agency regarding how the funds are spent is retained by States Parties in collaboration with affected communities, among others.

While incentivising the universalisation of the Treaty is understandable, the project to increase the coverage of the TPNW should not trump the project to remediate harm. A permissive approach to the eligibility recipients as well as donor states will help ensure that the trust fund does not use the wellbeing of affected communities as a bargaining chip to exert influence on governments to join the Treaty. A victims-centred, needs-first approach should guide the distribution of funds and measures put in place to ensure that the Treaty does not inadvertently deepen inequalities by leaving affected communities in non-States Parties behind. Such an approach would also allow for joined up, pan-Pacific remediation efforts to be explored.

The Treaty has provoked a positive normative shift, resulting in a wider appreciation of the need to address harms arising from nuclear testing. Under the leadership of Kiribati and Kazakhstan, the push for action on victim assistance and environmental remediation has now gained significant traction beyond the TPNW, with 171 states in the General Assembly voting in favour of a 2023 resolution...
on the matter. This suggests fertile fundraising potential, should the trust fund accept donations from non-States Parties.

The TPNW may have an important protective capacity for affected Pacific nation states, as the provision of environmental and humanitarian support could reduce the likelihood of susceptible nation states engaging in unfair trade, development, or aid deals and other neocolonial practices. The Treaty may also offer hybrid benefits for tackling future challenges arising due to the nuclear-climate change nexus, that is, environmental and humanitarian issues arising at the intersection of the legacy of nuclear weapons testing and the future threat of climate crisis. The Pacific nation states present the greatest vulnerability to risk in this context.

**Recommendations**

This report provides the following recommendations in line with current knowledge and understanding of Pacific community lives and challenges after surviving the nuclear weapons tests:

- It is fundamentally important that the outcomes of the TPNW are beneficial to local communities and help to uplift and offer opportunities for development. For this reason, mechanisms and safeguards, including long-term support, monitoring, auditing, and educational opportunities, must be in place before the Treaty is fit for implementation.

- The Treaty must be implemented through a structure of epistemic justice, which is justice of knowledge, and frameworks must be established to ensure parity of understanding among relevant Pacific communities. There are many ways that this can be achieved. i.e., community engagement, translation of materials into local non-colonial languages, establishing community networks and mentors.

- Victims of nuclear testing seek and deserve not only medical assistance, but should also be provided support to address psycho-social and cultural consequences of the nuclear weapons test programs.

- Policy interventions should acknowledge the intrinsic value many Pacific peoples place on the environment, not just its instrumental worth.

- A complete environmental and public health study led by experts in the field is needed to ascertain future needs and understand the true legacy of nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific.

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- A genetic study of descendants of those present during the nuclear weapons tests should be commissioned and completed.

- The TPNW should consider the needs of all communities affected by nuclear weapons detonations in the Pacific, including nuclear test veterans and Pacific peoples residing in states and non-States Parties and their descendants.

- Cooperation and assistance – including information, technical, and financial assistance – should be provided to states working to address the impacts of nuclear tests on the rights of their populations and their environment.

- A wide variety of donors should be eligible to contribute to the proposed international trust fund, including States Parties, non-States Parties, international organisations, foundations, and private finance to maximise fundraising potential.

- A victims-centred, needs-first approach should guide the distribution of resources from the proposed international trust fund with funds made accessible to affected communities residing in non-States Parties.

- The proposed international trust fund should establish an inclusive, multi-stakeholder governance model comprising affected communities (from both within and outside TPNW States Parties), independent civil society experts as well as representatives of States Parties among others, ensuring that control over the fund is retained by those supportive of the TPNW.

- Novel ways to overcome the scenario of a funding shortfall or possible hurdles in terms of eligibility of non-States Party recipients should be considered in relation to the proposed international trust fund, including the exploration of linkages with other funds, frameworks, and bilateral/multilateral arrangements.
About APLN

The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN) is a Seoul-based organisation and network of political, military, and diplomatic leaders and experts from across the Asia-Pacific region working to address global security challenges, with a particular focus on reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons risks.

The mission of APLN is to inform and stimulate debate, influence action, and propose policy recommendations designed to address regional security threats, with an emphasis on nuclear and other WMD (weapon of mass destruction) threats, and to do everything possible to achieve a world in which nuclear weapons and other WMDs are contained, diminished, and eventually eliminated.