



State-to-state cooperation between NATO and IP4 member states: successes, constraints, and prospects for crisis prevention

A planning toolkit for Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic
cooperation to prevent and manage crises

July 2026



*This project
is supported by:*

The NATO Science for Peace
and Security Programme

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This research was sponsored by the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme under grant id. SPS. MYP. G7935. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of NATO, the European Leadership Network, the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, or the other institutions mentioned in this report.

Introduction

The relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and its four Indo-Pacific partners, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), has evolved considerably in recent years. This grouping is now commonly referred to as the Indo-Pacific 4 (IP4), as originally named by NATO. This report focuses on how individual NATO and IP4 states can cooperate at the interstate level. A separate report, *Institutional cooperation between NATO and IP4*, focuses on policy recommendations that can be adopted at the NATO-IP4 institutional level.

The leaders of IP4 have attended NATO summits, and each has deepened its respective Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP) with the alliance.¹ Moreover, there has been an increase in state-to-state engagement between members of NATO and the IP4, including enhanced security cooperation between Japan and France and the signing of the UK-ROK Global Strategic Partnership. This alignment reflects a growing mutual recognition that security challenges in one region are increasingly linked to those in the other.

Yet the partnership now faces significant headwinds. Two factors in particular constrain the further deepening of cross-theatre, state-to-state cooperation. The first is diverging threat perceptions of China, North Korea, and Russia across and within the two groupings. The second is the ongoing turbulence in relations between the United States and other alliance members on both sides, which has introduced a degree of strategic uncertainty that colours all aspects of the partnership.

This report draws on working group discussions between Track-II Euro-Atlantic and IP4 experts from November 2025 to April 2026. It assesses the potential for state-to-state cooperation to support crisis prevention and, more limitedly, crisis management. It examines examples of cooperation, analyses recent changes in US strategy, and explores specific areas including defence industrial resilience, maritime security, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, and emerging technologies, before offering recommendations. The target audience is decision-makers in key Euro-Atlantic and IP4 capitals working on cross-regional security cooperation.

Successes and challenges in cross-theatre cooperation

Existing platforms can be leveraged for cross-theatre cooperation, including the United Nations Command on the Korean Peninsula; maritime security mechanisms related to fisheries and safety of sea lines of communication (SLOCs); cybersecurity frameworks; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) arrangements; and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. None were designed for cross-theatre crisis prevention, but each offers institutional infrastructure that could be adapted.

Defence industry cooperation and procurement are among the most promising areas for closer alignment. Security cooperation is increasingly framed through industrial resilience, supply chains, and sustainment rather than military presence alone. Countries should improve sustainment and supply chain resilience measures in peacetime. Contingency cooperation plans can play an important role in this, with a cross-regional sustainment agreement as one such initiative.

However, successful cooperation must also recognise the psychological and cultural constraints that vary across countries. The concept of 'social licence', the implicit consent of publics and stakeholders to particular security and defence arrangements, is a useful framework for managing contested issues such as nuclear submarine procurement or foreign troop deployments.² These efforts also need attention to social licence to remain politically sustainable.

Financing remains a challenge. The Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) could be one possible model for collective financing among like-minded countries. The DSRB is envisaged as a multilateral institution owned by nation-states, providing affordable long-term financing for defence and security, supporting procurement, and unlocking private capital through guarantees.³

The institutionalisation of the IP4 itself remains an open question. Bilateral and minilateral state-to-state cooperation should come first, as it represents a more realistic and attainable form of cooperation in the near term. IP4 countries should consider how, if at all, they wish to develop their own internal cooperation beyond the NATO framework. A cautious approach is recommended, given the finite resources of smaller partners such as New Zealand and the diplomatic sensitivities of a formal grouping in relation to China.

The impact of US strategy on cross-theatre cooperation

The implications of the 2025 US National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) feature prominently in this analysis.⁴ While the NSS reaffirms alliances, deterrence, and strategic competition, it carries a stronger transactional tone than previous iterations. Allies interpret the documents as a signal to do more regionally, not simply to align rhetorically with Washington.

From the Euro-Atlantic side, this shift is unsettling, particularly in light of the US assertion of claims to Greenland. From the ROK perspective, the absence of attention paid to North Korea from the NSS creates 'uncomfortable ambiguity' in Seoul. From the wider Indo-Pacific, continuity in US military presence and operations nonetheless reduces some planning uncertainty.

Pentagon planning and funding flows, rather than the NSS text itself, will determine actual outcomes. This environment incentivises state-to-state cooperation outside of or alongside US-led frameworks. Middle-power countries can continue to support global public goods including standards, maritime governance, supply chain assurance, and dispute-resolution frameworks where US provision is contested or inconsistent.

The PIPIR framework and defence industrial cooperation

PIPIR

The Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) is a potentially useful but structurally limited framework.⁵ It is primarily US-led, with limited scope for expansion unless partners develop stronger ownership mechanisms. Governments must actively align industry incentives with strategic goals, as market logic alone discourages cooperation among unevenly developed defence industries.

PIPIR is particularly valuable as technical and sustainment-focused cooperation that complements NATO rather than exporting alliance structures. Among the IP4, the ROK is an arms export powerhouse but needs more durable political commitment to cross-theatre cooperation, Japan has political commitment and has recently moved to ease longstanding legal constraints on defence exports, and New Zealand has niche advantages including in drones and aerospace startups.

The PIPIR framework should distinguish more clearly between deterrence and peacetime cooperation, where broader membership including states such as Thailand and Malaysia is appropriate, and wartime cooperation, which would necessarily involve a smaller group realistically willing and able to sustain supply under conflict conditions. The post-Ukraine shifting in 155mm ammunition demand, where South Korea and – subsequently – European producers dominated, illustrates how rapidly priorities shift once conflict begins. Australia's pause on its plans to be a regional 155mm hub showed the fragility of peacetime industrial planning when economic conditions change.

Defence industrial cooperation

A sub-regional, variable-geometry approach to defence industrial cooperation is preferable to a single overarching framework.

Women, peace, and security

Cooperation clusters can be organised around specific capability areas, with lead states matched to their comparative strengths and other partners plugging in where they add value. The Japan-Australia *Mogami*-class frigate cooperation, in which components are built in Japan and later assembled in Australia, as well as Japanese training of the Australian workforce, illustrates the model. New Zealand is also considering whether similar platforms could form the basis of an Australia-Japan-New Zealand maritime cluster.

Demographic constraints in Japan and the ROK present an additional structural challenge for defence industrial cooperation. Distributed production models, in which certain components or subsystems are built across partner countries, can mitigate national workforce limitations while increasing shared stakes in platforms and improving supply chain redundancy. Recent cooperation on the *Mogami*-class frigate, the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), and AUKUS Pillar II is already generating expanded defence attaché networks and embedded technical staff in partner embassies, with positive spillover into other domains.⁶

The WPS agenda is currently stagnant and siloed, with diminishing visibility in US security policymaking. Linking WPS to economic security, resilience, and whole-of-society defence offers a pathway to renewed relevance. NATO and IP4 remain suitable platforms for sustaining WPS norms even if US engagement wanes. National constraints such as South Korea's conscription system highlight the need for comparative learning on inclusive and multicultural militaries.

The WPS agenda is essential to the strategic mission of cross-theatre cooperation, not a discretionary add-on. More equitable societies are more resilient societies, better able to sustain the long-term political and economic commitments that crisis prevention requires. Greater leadership diversity enriches policymaking by mobilising the full intellectual capacity of partner nations to meet the challenges they face, and the WPS agenda reinforces the basic democratic norms that distinguish the values base of the NATO-IP4 partnership. These dimensions also link directly to the Arctic and maritime security domains discussed below, where inclusive policymaking strengthens whole-of-society responses to grey-zone and sub-threshold pressures.

Maritime security and the Arctic

The Arctic is emerging as a cross-theatre security domain, shaped by new SLOCs and intensifying Russia-China coordination. This is a special opportunity for NATO-IP4 cooperation. Such cooperation should nevertheless potentially recognise different threat profiles on the Atlantic and Pacific flanks, with Canada playing a leading linking role in this regard.

In planning for this theatre, NATO and IP4 should prioritise building closer Arctic cooperation between the ROK, Japan, and NATO for the security of emerging High North SLOCs, including by organising military-to-military discussions and procedures for standardised and interoperable joint operations to support the emergence of trade shipping routes. Closer International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea cooperation as well as route maintenance (icebreakers and countering sludge ice capability) could be coordinated.

Building upon joint military cooperation in the Arctic/High North, political discussions should be held on Japan and ROK seeking formal membership of the Alliance. Plans could be discussed at the political level in advance as a contingency for drawing up membership action plans for both Japan and ROK. The purpose of this would be to create closer ties, alliance cohesion and strategic dilemmas on addressing threats from both Russia and China as part of a future North Atlantic and Arctic Treaty Organisation.

SLOC security, dark shipping detection, sanctions and proliferation networks, and illicit criminal flows should be viewed as one interrelated priority tied to trade resilience and freedom of navigation. Joint dark-shipping detection and maritime data sharing, rotating between a Pacific hub and a North Atlantic hub, could be a practical new initiative.

US claims on Greenland's status have undermined trust among some European actors, with Indo-Pacific governments registering concern at the reputational spillovers. Ending this dispute in favour of the status quo will facilitate closer cooperation against shared Arctic threats. The Antarctic Treaty System could be further safeguarded through science-security dialogues.

A pilot Pacific-North Atlantic Maritime Domain Awareness Forum is another concrete near-term deliverable, focused on dark shipping detection, grey-zone tactics, and undersea infrastructure protection. Rather than creating new institutions, building on existing platforms including Operation NEON and Canadian dark-vessel detection technology shared with Taiwan would be an effective way to proceed.⁷ IP4 partners should consolidate their assessments intra-regionally before bridging cross-regionally to NATO, and vice versa.

Emerging technologies and research cooperation

Greater precision is needed on the specific technologies for cross-theatre cooperative development. For example, AUKUS Pillar II should be narrowed to a small set of itemised agendas to accelerate outcomes, with hypersonics as one key priority.⁸ Areas of immediate practical value include AI and data analytics for maritime domain awareness, including shared models for dark shipping and proliferator network detection with appropriate guardrails.

Measures that should be adopted as a matter of priority include export controls and intellectual property templates aligned with US regulatory standards; reinvigorated counter-proliferation focused on dual-use leakage routes; and coordinated research-security practices in sensitive fields. Minilateral forums require early alignment on burden-sharing, intellectual property, export markets, and security vetting. Public acceptance also matters, including broadening what 'defence expenditure' covers and articulating civilian spillovers to sustain domestic support.

AI can be used in the opposite direction to the threat it poses, with joint investment in rapid pathogen identification, detection kits, and accelerated development of treatments serving both as biosecurity for pandemics and as deterrence by reducing the utility of biological weapons whose effects can be quickly countered. Cooperation should draw together military medical services, civilian health systems, and research institutions across NATO and IP4. A 32-plus-IP4 information-sharing arrangement, more inclusive than Five Eyes but security-focused, is suitable for biological and chemical intelligence and technology cooperation.

Trusted research policies in universities are a valuable baseline mechanism to reduce inadvertent or malign dual-use research collaboration, toward building a common trans-regional approach. The NATO Science and Technology Organisation, with its network of chief scientists and approximately 450 active projects, offers an underused vehicle for IP4 engagement on dual-use technology, biosecurity, and cyber. A persistent challenge is the funding gap between research and production; it should be a priority to bridge public and private finance to move promising defence-relevant technology through this gap.

State-to-state dialogues on acceptable and unacceptable weapons systems should be elevated and deepened.⁹ Such dialogues would address divergent national positions, illustrated by the US's continued provision of white phosphorus munitions to Israel and South Korea's continued use of such munitions justified by direct North Korean threats, and by ongoing divides on cluster munitions use and transfers as well as the use of landmines.¹⁰ The Australia Group, a chemical and biological weapons export control regime with 42 member states and the EU, is an existing framework with shared control lists and technical working groups that should be better linked to the NATO-IP4 toolkit.¹¹

Counter-proliferation is closely linked to the joint research and development (R&D) agenda. The relationship runs in both directions. Joint R&D in dual-use sectors creates leakage risks that legacy non-proliferation regimes were not designed to address, while the same R&D capacity can be turned to counter-proliferation outcomes such as AI-enabled detection of dual-use procurement networks, materials, machine tool flows, and specialised software.

A reinvigoration of practical counter-proliferation, focused on dual-use leakage routes and integrated with joint R&D pipelines, is a near-term priority. Existing regimes such as the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Missile Technology Control Regime are valuable platforms for this work, with closer trans-regional coordination on enforcement and shared control lists.

Recommendations

The working group's discussions point to a central conclusion. There is meaningful scope for pursuing crisis prevention efforts through state-to-state cooperation, even under the significant constraints that NATO and the IP4 currently face. However, the potential for cross-theatre crisis management remains limited, particularly in terms of NATO's ability to support crisis management in the Indo-Pacific and vice versa. Out of those described in the preceding sections, the following recommendations should especially be prioritised to strengthen the capacity to prevent crises from emerging in either region.

1. Favour informal, adaptable cooperation over heavy institutionalisation.

The IP4 should function as a flexible, pragmatic arrangement of like-minded countries rather than a formal multilateral. This approach keeps the door open for collective engagement while allowing individual state-NATO engagements based on each member's comparative advantages and interests. Heavy institutionalisation can complicate relationship management with major trading partners and reduce the diplomatic flexibility that smaller members value.

2. Develop sustained working-level engagement between Euro-Atlantic and IP4 capitals.

Practical steps include reciprocal embedded staff in defence and foreign ministries, regular policy planning consultations among national security councils, expanded defence attaché networks, and joint official-level scenario planning on shared dossiers such as supply chain resilience and dark-shipping detection.

3. Use coalitions-of-the-willing as a delivery mechanism.

Effective cooperation is increasingly driven by coalitions-of-the-willing rather than universal consensus. This model, already visible in coordinating assistance to Ukraine, allows countries that are more eager to move forward without being held back by those that are reluctant. It may be the most effective way to manage Indo-Pacific engagement within the current political constraints.

4. Develop a cross-regional sustainment agreement and contingency cooperation plans.

Supply chain resilience and sustainment cooperation should not be limited to peacetime. Contingency plans should be developed in advance, and a cross-regional sustainment agreement could provide the framework for this. Deeper IP4 integration with NATO's Support and Procurement Agency for joint procurement, sustainment, and burden-sharing should be pursued, alongside

engagement with the emerging DSRB, whose charter is being negotiated by 18 nations including at least one IP4 country.

5. Plan for variable cooperation geometries.

Capitals should expect a mix of bilateral, minilateral, and EU-mediated cooperation rather than a single channel. National planners on both sides should map how their state-to-state arrangements interact with EU instruments for economic disruption and defence supply scaling, so that institutional pathways complement rather than substitute for direct cooperation.

6. Pursue targeted defence industrial specialisation among IP4 members.

Each IP4 country should identify and develop its comparative advantage: the ROK in arms exports, Japan in political commitment and technology, Australia in critical minerals and maritime capabilities, and New Zealand in niche areas including space.

7. Establish joint dark-shipping detection and maritime data-sharing operations.

Rotating between Pacific and North Atlantic hubs, this initiative would address SLOC security, sanctions enforcement, and proliferation networks as interconnected challenges. A third cooperative pillar focused on munitions production between NATO and IP4 members should be considered, complementing existing arrangements.

8. Narrow AUKUS Pillar II to accelerate deliverables.

Focusing on a small number of itemised agendas, such as hypersonics, AI for maritime domain awareness, and counter-proliferation technologies, would reduce diffusion of effort and produce tangible outcomes more quickly.

9. Link the WPS agenda to resilience and economic security.

Reframing WPS in terms of whole-of-society defence and economic resilience offers a pathway to renewed relevance and practical cooperation, leveraging NATO's existing leadership in this space. This should occur in tandem with a renewed focus on conflict prevention in the region.

10. Use intelligence-sharing as a basis for *ad hoc* expansion of the IP4 network.

Specific information-sharing cooperation could bring in additional partners such as Singapore and the Philippines without formally expanding the group, preserving the flexibility of the current arrangement while broadening its practical reach.

11. Pursue an AI-enabled biosecurity initiative across NATO and IP4 states.

A joint programme on rapid pathogen identification, detection kit development, and accelerated treatment design would deliver public health benefits while reducing the strategic utility of

biological weapons. Cooperation should draw on military medical services, civilian health systems, and research institutions across both regions, and could be supported by a 32-plus-IP4 information-sharing arrangement focused on biological and chemical threats.

12. Establish a Pacific-North Atlantic Maritime Domain Awareness Forum.

A pilot forum focused on dark shipping detection, grey-zone tactics, and undersea infrastructure protection would build on existing platforms including Operation NEON and Canadian dark-vessel detection technology, rather than creating new institutions. The principle of intra-regional consolidation followed by cross-regional sharing should guide its design.

13. Reinvigorate counter-proliferation through joint R&D pipelines.

Dual-use research cooperation should be paired from the outset with counter-proliferation outputs, including AI-enabled detection of procurement networks, integrated tracking of materials and machine tool flows, and shared control lists. Existing regimes such as the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Missile Technology Control Regime should be used as the institutional anchor for trans-regional enforcement coordination.

14. Utilise existing multilateral platforms to facilitate additional engagement between NATO and the IP4.

There are many existing multilateral and minilateral platforms that both NATO and the IP4 could use to strengthen their engagement. Both sides could make greater use of existing forums, such as ASEAN+3, the G7, and NATO summits, to expand dialogue and deepen cooperation.

Conclusion

The strategic environment confronting NATO and IP4 states is defined by interconnected threats, shifting alliance dynamics, and uncertainty about US engagement. The most productive path forward lies in pragmatic, adaptable state-to-state cooperation that builds resilience, improves mutual understanding, and strengthens the capacity for coordinated action before crises emerge. The recommendations in this report are designed to be implementable under current constraints and to position both regions for more effective cooperation as the strategic environment evolves.

Notes

- 1 For an overview of NATO's partnership architecture with the IP4, see NATO, "Relations with partners across the globe", October 3, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49188.htm. Each IP4 state has agreed an Individually Tailored Partnership Programme with NATO. The Japan ITPP 2023-2026, the Australia ITPP, the ROK ITPP, and the New Zealand ITPP 2024-2027 are published by each national ministry of foreign affairs.
- 2 On the concept of social licence, see International Atomic Energy Agency, "Social Licence", Nuclear Communicator's Toolbox, accessed June 23, 2026, <https://www.iaea.org/resources/nuclear-communicators-toolbox/basics/trust/social-licence>. For its application to the issues raised in this report and the preceding workshop discussions, see Maria Rost Rublee, "AUKUS: What to do with nuclear waste?", The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, April 17, 2023, <https://www.loyyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/aukus-what-do-nuclear-waste>.
- 3 Defence, Security and Resilience Bank, "What is the DSRB", accessed June 23, 2026, <https://www.dsrb.org>. See also Rob Murray, "How a new global defense bank can solve US and allied funding problems", Atlantic Council, December 13, 2024, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/how-a-new-global-defense-bank-can-solve-us-and-allied-funding-problems/>.
- 4 White House, "National Security Strategy of the United States of America", December 2025, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf>. US Department of Defense, "2026 National Defense Strategy", January 23, 2026, <https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF>. For analysis, see Brookings Institution, "Breaking down Trump's 2025 National Security Strategy", December 8, 2025, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/breaking-down-trumps-2025-national-security-strategy/>; and Seth G. Jones, "The 2026 National Defense Strategy by the Numbers: Radical Changes, Moderate Changes, and Some Continuities", Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 28, 2026, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/2026-national-defense-strategy-numbers-radical-changes-moderate-changes-and-some>.
- 5 PIPIR was launched in May 2024 under the Biden administration as a multilateral defence-industrial cooperation framework focused on supply chain resilience, sustainment, and co-production among US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. See US Department of Defense, "Fact Sheet: Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience", June 2025, <https://media.defense.gov/2025/Jun/02/2003730341/-1/-1/1/FACT-SHEET-PARTNERSHIP-FOR-INDO-PACIFIC-INDUSTRIAL-RESILIENCE.PDF>. For the Trump-era continuation, see US Department of Defense, "Joint Statement Reaffirming a Shared Commitment to Defense Industrial Resilience", March 20, 2026, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4439861/>.
- 6 On the upgraded Mogami-class frigate selected by Australia in August 2025 for the Royal Australian Navy general-purpose frigate programme, see Australian Department of Defence, "Mogami-class frigate selected for the Navy's new general purpose frigates", August 5, 2025, <https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2025-08-05/mogami-class-frigate-selected-navys-new-general-purpose-frigates>, and Royal Australian Navy, "General purpose frigate", accessed June 23, 2026, <https://www.navy.gov.au/capabilities/ships-boats-and-submarines/general-purpose-frigate>. On GCAP (UK-Japan-Italy), see UK Government, "Convention on the Establishment of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) International Government Organisation", December 14, 2023, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/convention-on-the-establishment-of-the-global-combat-air-programme-gcap-international-government-organisation>. On AUKUS Pillar II, see Luke A. Nicastro, "AUKUS Pillar 2 (Advanced Capabilities): Background and Issues for Congress", Congressional Research Service, May 21, 2024, <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47599>.
- 7 Operation NEON is Canada's contribution to the multinational effort to monitor United Nations Security Council sanctions imposed against North Korea, including ship-to-ship transfers in the Sea of Japan, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea. See Government of Canada, "Operation NEON", April 29, 2026, <https://www.canada.ca/en/departement-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-neon.html>. On the Canadian dark-vessel detection technology, built by MDA Space for Canada's Department of Fisheries and Oceans using synthetic aperture radar, and the August 2025 memorandum of understanding under which it is shared with Taiwan, see Steven Chase, "Canada lends 'dark vessel' detection gear to help Taiwan track Chinese ships", The Globe and Mail, August 21, 2025, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canada-taiwan-china-dark-vessel-detection-technology/>; "Taiwan, Canada sign MOU to combat IUU fishing", Focus Taiwan (CNA), August 11, 2025, <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202508110010>; and MDA Space, "Dark Vessel Detection Technology from MDA Space Recognized in the G7 Declaration on Maritime Security", May 2, 2025, <https://mda.space/insights/dark-vessel-detection-technology-from-mda-space-recognized-in-the-g7-declaration-on-maritime-security>.
- 8 AUKUS Pillar II currently spans at least eight working groups covering undersea capabilities, quantum technologies, AI and autonomy, advanced cyber, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, electronic warfare, innovation, and information sharing. See Nicastro, "AUKUS Pillar 2 (Advanced Capabilities): Background and Issues for Congress".

- 9 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is the principal existing 42-state multilateral export control regime. See Wassenaar Arrangement, “Home”, June 17, 2025, <https://www.wassenaar.org>, and Arms Control Association, “The Wassenaar Arrangement at a Glance”, February 2022, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/wassenaar>. State-to-state dialogue among NATO-IP4 members can complement the WA by developing stricter lists and more robust compliance through the closer strategic convergence available among these states than is achievable across the wider WA membership.
- 10 On US and allied positions on cluster munitions transfers, including the Convention on Cluster Munitions and divergent positions among allies, see Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, December 16, 2024, <https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RS22907>.
- 11 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “The Australia Group – Participants”, accessed July 28, 2026, <https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/theaustraliagroupnet/site/en/participants.html>.

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Published by the European Leadership Network and the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, July 2026

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